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In the second half of the 1990s, copyright owners repeatedlysought Congress’s help addressing the challenges posed by the
Internet and other new technologies.  Congress responded with a
suite of new protections, including restrictions against circumven-
tion,1 longer copyright terms,2 increased statutory damages,3 and
criminalization of willful non-commercial infringement.
This Article examines the latter of those changes, effectuated
through the No Electronic Theft Act4 (the “Act” or the “NET
Act”).  The Act represents a significant change to copyright law
be cause it subtly shifts the paradigm underlying criminal copy-
right infringement.  For 100 years, criminal infringement pun-
ished infringers who derived a commercial benefit based on
someone else’s copyrighted work.  However, through the Act,
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1 See  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998), available at  http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?Paddress=162.
140.64.21&filename=publ304.pdf&directory=/diskc/wais/data/105_cong_public_laws
(the DMCA).
2 See  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998), available at  http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/s505.pdf.
3 See  Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999), available at  http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.3456.ENR.
4 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997),
available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/17-18red.htm.
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Congress adopted a paradigm that criminal copyright infringe-
ment is like physical-space theft,5 specifically shoplifting.6  As a
result, the Act significantly extends the boundaries of criminal
copyright infringement.7
Despite the extended criminal boundaries, a review of the
post-passage developments suggests that the Act has been unex-
pectedly ineffective.  To fully understand why, this Article fo-
cuses on a group of infringers known as warez traders.  Warez,
pronounced the same as “wares,” are copies of infringed copy-
righted works (often commercial software) with any copy protec-
tion mechanisms removed.8  A warez trader has been defined as
an individual “who copies and distributes computer software sim-
ply for self-aggrandizement—the reputation, the thrill, the ‘fun’
of having the latest programs or the biggest ‘library’ of ‘warez’
titles.”9  More generally, warez traders are enthusiasts who trade
or distribute warez as an avocation10 and thus are a sociological
5 See , e.g. , 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (“[W]e value intellectual property . . . in the same way that we value the
real and personal property of our citizens.”).
6 Id.  (“Just as we will not tolerate the theft of software, CDs, books, or movie
cassettes from a store, so we will not permit the stealing of intellectual property over
the Internet.”); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Goodlatte) (analogizing between online piracy and retail shoplifting, saying
that “[p]irating works online is the same as shoplifting a videotape, book or record
from a store” and expressing a desire to prevent the Internet from becoming the
“Home Shoplifting Network.”).
7 See  4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 15.01[B][2] (2002) (the NET Act defines criminal activity under the Copyright Act
“much more widely than it had ever been drawn before under U.S. criminal copy-
right strictures.”) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
8 See The New Hacker’s Dictionary: “W” , at http://www.jargon.8hz.com/
jargon_38.html#SEC45 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).  “Warez” is shorthand for
“software,” with the “z” a naming convention for pirated items (i.e., “applications”
is shortened to appz, “games” becomes gamez, etc.).  Stephen Granade, Warez,
Abandonware, and the Software Industry , Brasslantern.com, at http://brass-lan-
tern.org/community/companies/warez.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Granade, Warez].
9 Copyright Piracy, and H.R. 2265, the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act:  Hearings
on H.R. 2265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary , 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Sandra A. Sellers, V.P. of Intellectual Property Education and Enforcement for the
Software Publishers Association), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/commit-
tees/judiciary/hju48724.000/hju48724_0.htm.
10 David Tetzlaff, Yo-Ho-Ho and a Server of Warez , in  The World Wide Web and
Contemporary Cultural Theory 104 (Andrew Herman & Thomas Swiss eds. 2000)
(“Trading warez is not something its participants only do every now and then.  It’s a
full-blown avocation that takes up a considerable amount of time.”); see David Mc-
Candless, Warez Wars , WIRED, Apr. 1997 (discussing one warez trader who spent 12
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group unique to the Internet.
While Congress did not specifically reference warez trading in
the Act, warez traders were its prime target.11  Yet, Congress did
not fully understand this sociological group or their motivations,
resulting in a law poorly tailored to conforming their behavior.
But in drafting a broad law to cover warez trading, the Act over-
states the harm experienced by copyright owners.  This expansive
standard for harm covers activities necessary to function in a dig-
ital society, unnecessarily turning too many average Americans
into criminals.  Corrective legislation is required to more pre-
cisely distinguish between truly culpable behavior and socially
beneficial conduct.
Part I of this Article discusses the Act’s development, from the
LaMacchia  case in 1994 through the President’s signature in
1997.  Part II discusses development since the Act’s passage, in-
cluding the difficulties implementing it and prosecutions brought
under the Act.  Part III analyzes the Act’s consequences, includ-
ing its weak effect on piracy and its misunderstanding of how to
change warez traders’ behavior.  Part IV talks about problems
created by the Act’s scope, including the problems created by a
weak definition of willfulness and a failure to distinguish be-
tween infringers and facilitators.  Part V discusses a proposal to
set an appropriate policy basis for imposing criminal liability for
copyright infringement.  The Article concludes with Part VI.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACT
A. The LaMacchia Case
Prior to the Act, criminal copyright infringement required will-
ful infringement committed for commercial advantage or private
financial gain.12  A case involving David LaMacchia highlighted
the limits of this statute.13
David LaMacchia was a twenty-one-year-old student at the
hours a day online and another who spent 6-10 hours a day during the week and 12-
16 hours a day on the weekends), available at  http:// hotwired.wired.com/collections/
hacking_warez/5.04_warez_wars_pr.html [hereinafter McCandless, Warez Wars].
11 See infra  section I(c).
12 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2].
13 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994), available at
http://www.loundy.com/CASES/US_v_LaMacchia.html.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”).14  From late
1993 to early 1994, he used MIT’s equipment to operate Cyno-
sure, a bulletin board system (“BBS”) that allowed users to
upload and download infringing software applications and vide-
ogames.15  LaMacchia was not accused of uploading or
downloading any infringing programs himself.  However, prose-
cutors asserted that he maintained the BBS (including deleting
files and transferring files between servers) and asked BBS users
to upload specific software programs.16  Judge Stearns described
LaMacchia’s behavior as, at best, “heedlessly irresponsible, and
at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamen-
tal sense of values.”17  Although the term was not widely used at
the time, LaMacchia was an early warez trader.
Like a typical warez trader, LaMacchia operated the BBS for
fun and without any commercial advantage or private financial
gain.  Therefore, prosecutors could not charge him with criminal
copyright infringement.  Instead, prosecutors charged him with
one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.18  Judge Stearns
applied the U.S. Supreme Court case of Dowling v. United States ,
which had ruled that intangible intellectual property was not ca-
pable of being stolen, converted or taken by fraud.19  That case,
he concluded, “precludes LaMacchia’s prosecution for criminal
copyright infringement under the wire fraud statute,”20 and he
dismissed the indictment.
Despite the dismissal, Judge Stearns issued a challenge to
Congress:
Criminal as well as civil penalties should probably attach to
willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted software even
absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer.  One
14 Id . at 536.
15 Id .  Prosecutors alleged that these websites operated “on an international
scale” and caused losses of more than $1 million. Id . at 536-37.  The loss estimates
have been characterized as unsupported estimates. See  Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Kris-
tina E. Barclay, When the Heartland is “Outside the Heartland:”  the New Guidelines
for NET Act Sentencing , 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 373, 377 (2000).
16 Indictment, United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (No.
9410092-RGS), available at  http://www-tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/LaMacchia/indict-
ment.html.
17 LaMacchia , 871 F. Supp. at 545.
18 Id . at 541-42.  Wire fraud does not require the government to prove that the
defendant sought to personally profit from the scheme.
19 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), available at http://caselaw.lp.
findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=473&invol=207.
20 LaMacchia , 871 F. Supp. at 545.
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can envision ways that the copyright law could be modified to
permit such prosecution.  But, it is the legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.21
B. A Legislative Response to LaMacchia
Copyright owners seized upon Judge Stearns’s challenge and
lobbied Congress for just such a law.  In August 1995, Sen. Leahy
introduced the Criminal Copyright Improvement Act of 1995,
which included provisions for punishing infringement without fi-
nancial gain or commercial advantage.22  Though that bill did not
pass, a subsequent bill led to the NET Act, which was enacted in
1997.23
The Act effected six principal changes to criminal copyright
law.  First, the NET Act expanded the Copyright Act’s definition
of “financial gain” to include the receipt (or expectation of re-
ceipt) of anything of value, including other copyrighted works.24
Second, in addition to willful infringement for commercial ad-
vantage or private financial gain, the Act criminalized the repro-
duction or distribution, in any 180 day period, of copyrighted
works with a total retail value of more than $1,000.25  Third, the
Act said that evidence of reproducing and distributing copy-
righted works does not, by itself, establish willfulness.26  Fourth,
the Act changed the punishments for criminal infringement.  For
infringements of more than $1,000, the punishment includes im-
prisonment of up to one year and a fine.  For infringements of
$2,500 or more, the punishment includes imprisonment of up to
three years and a fine.  For second or subsequent offenses involv-
ing commercial advantage or private financial gain, the punish-
ment includes imprisonment of up to six years.27  Fifth, the Act
permits copyright infringement victims to submit victim impact
21 Id . (quotation omitted).
22 S.1122, 104th Cong. § 2(b) (1995), available at  http://www.eff.org/Legislation/
Bills_by_number/s1122_95.bill. See generally  Lydia P. Loren, Digitization, Com-
modification, Criminalization:  the Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement
and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement , 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 861-62
(1999), available at  http://www.wulaw.wustl.edu/WULQ/77-3/773-835.pdf.
23 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/17-18red.htm. .
24 Id.  § 2(a).
25 Id.  § 2(b).
26 Id.
27 Id.  § 2(d).
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statements.28  Finally, the Act instructed the United States Sen-
tencing Commission (the “Sentencing Commission”) to adjust
the United States Sentencing Guidelines29 (the “Sentencing
Guidelines”) for criminal copyright infringement to make the
punishments sufficiently stringent to deter the crimes and to re-
flect the infringed items’ retail value and quantity.30
C. The Act’s Goals
Because the LaMacchia  case directly instigated the Act,31 the
law is often characterized as being intended to close the
LaMacchia  loophole.32  Indeed, the House Report said it desired
to “reverse the practical consequences of” the LaMacchia  case,33
and several legislators reiterated this goal.34  However, accepting
these statements on their face still leaves open a central question:
Exactly what aspects of LaMacchia  did Congress intend to
reverse?
Some legislators specifically targeted LaMacchia’s warez trad-
ing, referencing targets such as “commercial scale” piracy35 and
self-aggrandizing infringers.36
28 Id.
29 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1.1 (2002), available at  http://
www.ussc.gov/2002guid/2002guid.pdf.
30 Id.  § 2(g).
31 Hearings , supra  note 9 (statement of Rep. Coble) (“The NET Act constitutes a
legislative response to the so-called LaMacchia  case . . . .”).
32 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[B][2].
33 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 3 (1997).
34 See  143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte).
35 See  143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689-90 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (saying the Act’s purpose is to “prosecute commercial-scale pirates who
do not have commercial advantage or private financial gain from their illegal activi-
ties” and “eliminate willful, commercial-scale pirating of copyrighted works”); 143
CONG. REC. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (the
targets are “willful, commercial-scale pirates”); 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12690
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that the targets are indi-
viduals who “use computer networks for quick, inexpensive and mass distribution of
pirated, infringing works”); see also  Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney
General of the DOJ, to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Nov. 7, 1997), reprinted in  143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997)
(stating that the Act will permit “the Department to prosecute large-scale  illegal
reproduction or distribution of copyrighted works where the infringers act without a
discernable profit motive”) (emphasis added).
36 See  143 Cong. Rec. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (targeting software pirates who seek notoriety instead of money); 143 CONG.
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LaMacchia’s BBS primarily traded software (as opposed to
other copyrighted works), and the legislative history also exten-
sively discussed software piracy.  As the House Report says,
“copyright piracy flourishes in the software world” despite ex-
isting sanctions.37  The report cited industry estimates that
software counterfeiting and piracy cost copyright owners $11 bil-
lion in 1996,38 resulting in “130,000 lost U.S. jobs, $5.6 billion in
corresponding lost wages, $1 billion in lower tax revenue, and
higher prices for honest purchasers of copyrighted software.”39
Individual legislators also expressed a desire to target software
pirates40 and to protect the software industry.41
Finally, even though the Act criminalizes infringements re-
gardless of distribution media, several legislators specifically
targeted Internet-based piracy.42  Of course, the Act’s title (“No
REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Cannon) (targeting
“Robin Hood” types); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (state-
ment of Rep. Frank) (the Act aims at “seriously maladjusted” individuals who in-
fringe not for profit but to show their smarts and get attention).
37 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4 (1997); see also  Rep. Howard Coble, The Spring
1998 Horace S. Manges Lecture—The 105th Congress:  Recent Developments in Intel-
lectual Property Law , 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS. 269 (1998) (reprinting the
House Report with some additional commentary by Rep. Coble).
38 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4 (1997).  The report paranethetically adds that
“others believe the figure is closer to $20 billion.” Id. ; see also infra  Section III(A)
(further examining these numbers).
39 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4 (1997).  Some of these statistics were reiterated by
individual legislators. See , e.g. , 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9887 (daily ed. Nov. 4,
1997) (statement of Rep. Delahunt).
40 See  143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Cannon) (stating that the Act enables the Justice Department to go after software
pirates); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte) (stating that he expects the Act to deter potential software pirates).
41 See  143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12691 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (saying that the Act will “help protect the interests of the entire software indus-
try”); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Cannon) (saying that the Act will benefit the software industry); cf. 143 CONG. REC.
H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (discussing
how software and entertainment media play important roles in managing the United
States’ balance of payments with other countries).
42 See  143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12690 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (stating that the Act encourages “the continued growth of the Internet”);
143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9887 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Berman)
(the Act is “essential to the continuing growth of the Internet”); 143 CONG. REC.
H9883, H9887 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (“I believe this
measure will help preserve the creative incentive on which so much of our prosper-
ity—and the future of the Internet itself—depend.”); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885
(daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (stating that the Act “helps
consumers realize the promise and potential of the Internet”).
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Electronic Theft,” with the acronym “NET”) reinforces that
objective.
Therefore, the legislative history suggests Congress  targeted
LaMacchia’s use of the Internet to distribute infringing software
on a commercial scale but without a profit motive.  In other
words, Congress specifically targeted warez trading.
D. Enactment
For a law three years in the making and effecting a major
change in criminal law, there was surprisingly little organized op-
position.43  For example, none of the witnesses testifying about
the Act before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property on September 11, 1997 (the
“1997 Subcommittee Hearings”) raised any serious objections to
the Act’s passage.44  Two witnesses did express specific concerns
that the then-current version of the Act swept too broadly,45 but
both ultimately supported Congressional action (or at least
claimed to).46  During the Act’s floor debates, no legislator spoke
in opposition or raised any serious concerns.47  The Act passed
both the House and Senate by voice vote.48
43 The DMCA was being considered at the same time as the NET Act, and the
attention given to the DMCA probably overshadowed the NET Act.
44 Cf. 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9885 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Frank) (“This is a bill which was noncontroversial in its purpose.”).  However, of the
eight witnesses testifying at the Subcommittee hearing, two witnesses were govern-
ment employees and the remaining six were industry lobbyists. See Hearings , supra
note 9 (witness list), available at  http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41101.htm.  No law
professors, lobbyists for the academic or scientific community, criminal defense
counsel or consumer protection lobbyists testified at the hearing.  Also, no organiza-
tions representing musicians, artists or authors were included either.  Brian P.
Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness—Is Congress Making a Scare-
crow of the Law? , 1 SUFFOLK J. HIGH. TECH. L. 27, 29 (2002), available at  http://
www.law.suffolk.edu/stuservices/jhtl/V1N1/BHENEGHANV1N1N.pdf.
45 Kevin DiGregory raised concerns about the lack of a financial threshold for
criminal infringement. See Hearings , supra  note 9, at 45 (statement of Kevin
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the DOJ).
David Nimmer expressed concerns that the term “willfully” was not defined and
thus could expose Internet service providers to criminal liability. See id.  at 148-56
(statement of David Nimmer, attorney at Irell & Manella LLP, testifying on behalf
of the United States Telephone Association).
46 See Hearing , supra  note 9, at 46 (statement of Kevin DiGregory) (“The De-
partment is highly supportive of the goals of H.R. 2265”); id.  at 149 (statement of
David Nimmer) stating that his client “approves the spirit animating this legislative
fix”).
47 Some legislators discussed their concerns about the Act’s scope and definition
of willfulness. See infra  Section IV.
48 Fighting Internet Theft , Cong. Q. Almanac 3-15 (1997).
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While the Act was awaiting presidential signature, a group of
scientists led by the Association of Computing Machinery
(“ACM”) asked President Clinton to veto the Act,49 asserting
that the Act would have “a negative impact on the rich scientific
communications that have developed on the Internet.”50  This
last-minute request failed, and President Clinton signed the Act
on December 16, 1997.
II
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ACT’S ENACTMENT
A. Congressional Oversight of Implementation and Use
No convictions under the Act were announced in the first eigh-
teen months following the Act’s passage.  This perceived lack of
action prompted Rep. Howard Coble, one of the Act’s co-spon-
sors, to convene hearings of the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in May 1999
(the “Oversight Hearings”).  As Rep. Coble said at the hearings:
Since the enactment of the NET Act in December 1997, there
have been no prosecutions brought by the Department of Jus-
tice under the Act.  This is very troubling because, according
to U.S. intellectual property based industries, there is no
shortage of potential prosecutions that could be pursued
under the Act.51
Kevin DiGregory of the United States Department of Justice
(the “DOJ”) responded by enumerating several general chal-
lenges to prosecuting digital piracy,52 including:  (1) Internet pi-
rates do not have sizable or easily-located manufacturing
operations; (2) calculating damages and losses is difficult because
it is hard to count the number of illegitimate copies made over
the Internet; (3) no government agency has primary responsibil-
ity for enforcing Internet-based crimes, and prosecutions often
cut across prosecutors’ territories; and (4) Internet-savvy law en-
49 Letter from Dr. Barbara Simons, Chair, U.S. Public Policy Committee, Associa-
tion For Computing, to President William J. Clinton (Nov. 25, 1997), available at
http://www.acm.org/usacm/copyright/usacm-hr2265-letter.html.
50 Id .; see infra  Section IID (addressing the ACM’s specific arguments).
51 Implementation of the “Net” Act and Enforcement Against Internet Piracy:
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., House
Comm. on the Judiciary , 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Rep. Coble), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/cobl0512.htm.
52 Id.  (statement of Kevin DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Crim-
inal Division of the DOJ), available at  http://www.house.gov/judiciary/ digr0512.htm.
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forcement officials are hard to retain and often asked to help
with other computer crime enforcements.53
Mr. DiGregory also identified specific difficulties with enforc-
ing the Act against pirate website operators:54  (1) for-profit
criminals are a higher priority;55 (2) operators are often juveniles;
(3) websites move overseas, complicating investigation and en-
forcement; (4) establishing an operator’s identity can be chal-
lenging; (5) prosecutors cannot prove willfulness; (6) young not-
for-profit operators are sympathetic defendants;56 (7) the Sen-
tencing Commission had not established the mandated changes
to the Sentencing Guidelines; and (8) the Sentencing Guideline’s
computation of retail value leads to low penalties.  He concluded
that “although there are many websites on the Internet offering
illegal software and other copyrighted materials, investigating
and prosecuting the offenders is hardly shooting fish in a
barrel.”57
Despite the dozen challenges mentioned by Mr. DiGregory,
the DOJ also quickly responded to the Oversight Hearings, de-
livering the first criminal conviction under the Act just three
months later.  Since then, the prosecution machine has ramped
up significantly, and nearly eighty defendants have been con-
victed under the Act.58
B. Amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines
As mentioned earlier, the Act instructed the Sentencing Com-
mission to amend the Sentencing Guidelines to toughen the ap-
53 Id.  In July 1999, the DOJ addressed some of these concerns through its Intel-
lectual Property Rights Initiative, which increased the priority of intellectual prop-
erty crime enforcement, provided more training to prosecutors, expedited referrals
of matters, pursued equipment forfeiture and advocated changes to the Sentencing
Guidelines.  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Treasury,
Justice Department, FBI and Customs Service to Combat Intellectual Property
Crime (July 23, 1999), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipinitia.htm.
54 Hearing , supra  note 51 (statement of Kevin DiGregory).
55 Among other reasons, these individuals are higher priority because they tend to
run larger operations, make less sympathetic defendants and have records that are
more readily accessible as evidence. Id.
56 See  Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual § III(E)(4) (2001) (advising
prosecutors not to proceed with criminal infringement cases against sympathetic de-
fendants unless the prosecutor can show egregious conduct), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/03ipma.htm [hereinafter DOJ IP CRIMES MANUAL].
57 Hearing , supra  note 51 (statement of Kevin DiGregory).
58 See infra  Section II(c).
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plicable penalties and better define the applicable retail value.
Responding to this instruction, in January 1998 the Sentencing
Commission published a proposal and requested comments.59  A
hearing was held in March 1998, which resulted in a revised pro-
posal in April 1998 with a public comment period running
through August 1998.60
Analyzing these comments and other sources, a Policy Devel-
opment Team developed and released a report with recom-
mended changes in February 1999 (the “Team Report”).61  At
the Oversight Hearings, Rep. Coble criticized the Team Report
as failing “to address the NET Act’s explicit instructions to con-
sider that deterrence be adequately addressed” in the Guide-
lines.62  In any case, the Sentencing Commission did not act on
the Team Report because it lacked voting commissioners.63
On December 9, 1999, Congress reiterated its instructions to
the Sentencing Commission in the Digital Theft Deterrence and
Copyright Damages Improvement Act:
Within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or
within 120 days after the first date on which there is a suffi-
cient number of voting members of the Sentencing Commis-
sion to constitute a quorum, whichever is later, the
Commission shall promulgate emergency guideline amend-
ments to implement section 2(g) of the No Electronic Theft
(NET) Act (29 U.S.C. 994 note) in accordance with the proce-
dures set forth in section 21(a) of the Sentencing Act of 1987,
as though the authority under that Act had not expired.64
New commissioners were confirmed on November 15, 1999,
and the Sentencing Commission issued proposed emergency
guidelines on December 23, 1999 that took effect temporarily on
May 1, 2000 and became permanent on November 1, 2000.65
59 Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements
and Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. 602 (proposed Jan. 6, 1998).
60 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, NO ELEC. THEFT ACT:  POLICY DEV. TEAM RE-
PORT 1 (1999), available at http://www.ussc.gov/agendas/02_99/NETBRF99.PDF
[hereinafter Team Report].
61 Id.
62 Hearing , supra  note 51 (statement of Rep. Coble).
63 Hearing , supra  note 51 (statement of Timothy McGrath, Interim Staff Director,
U.S. Sentencing Commission), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
mcgr0512.htm.
64 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774.
65 Notice of:  (1) Promulgation of Temporary, Emergency Amendment to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Copyright and Trademark Infringement, Effective May 1,
2000; (2) Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines;
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Section 2B5.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, applicable to NET
Act prosecutions, now specifies:
• there must be a Base Offense Level of eight;66
• infringements between $2,000 and $5,000 receive a one
level increase and infringements over $5,000 receive an in-
crease pursuant to a table;67
• offenses involving the “manufacture, importation, or
uploading of infringing items” receive a two level increase
(but an offense level of no less than twelve);68
• offenses “not committed for commercial advantage or pri-
vate financial gain” receive a two level deduction (but an
offense level of no less than eight);69
• offenses involving “conscious or reckless risk of serious
bodily injury” or involving a dangerous weapon receive a
two level increase (but an offense level of no less than
thirteen);70
• offenses where the defendant decrypted or circumvented
technology to gain initial access to infringed items receive
an adjustment in accordance with the provisions applicable
to Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines;71 and
• an upward adjustment may be appropriate when the Sen-
tencing Guidelines understate the offense’s seriousness,
such as if the offense substantially harms the owner’s repu-
tation or the offense was part of an organized criminal
enterprise.72
Retail value generally is computed using the infringing  item’s
value,73 but the infringed  item’s value is used when:
• the infringing item is “identical or substantially equivalent
to the infringed item, or . . . is a digital or electronic
reproduction”;
• the infringing item’s retail price is not less than seventy-
five percent of the infringed item’s retail price;
• the infringing item’s retail value is difficult or impossible to
calculate without unduly complicating or prolonging the
proceedings;
and, (3) Request for Comment, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,880 (May 9, 2000), available at  http:/
/www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/FR2000.htm; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N OFFICE
OF EDUC. & SENTENCING PRACTICE, 2000 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines , at 1, available at  http://www.ussc.gov/2000guid/2000amd high00.pdf.
66 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3(a) (2002), available at  http://
www.ussc.gov/2002guid/2002guid.pdf.
67 Id.  § 2B5.3(b)(1).
68 Id.  § 2B5.3(b)(2).
69 Id.  § 2B5.3(b)(3).
70 Id.  § 2B5.3(b)(4).
71 Id.  § 2B5.3, cmt. 4.
72 Id.  § 2B5.3, cmt. 5.
73 Id.  § 2B5.3, app. 1.
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• satellite cable transmissions are illegally intercepted; or
• the infringed item’s retail value more accurately assesses
the pecuniary harm suffered by the owner.74
C. Prosecutions under the Act
As mentioned above, nearly eighty defendants have been con-
victed under the Act.  This subsection discusses some of the pub-
licized convictions.
1. Jeffrey Levy
In August 1999, Jeffrey Levy, a twenty-two-year old University
of Oregon senior, became the first individual convicted under the
Act.  He operated a website that allowed third parties to
download thousands of software and game programs, songs, and
movies, at least some of which Levy uploaded himself.75  After
Levy was arrested and an information was filed against him, he
was given a choice:  he could remain in prison six months while
the FBI analyzed his computers to determine the value of the
infringing works, or he could plead guilty.76  Levy chose the lat-
ter and pleaded guilty to distributing software with a retail value
of at least $5,000 (although a “conservative[ ] estimate” of the
actual retail value was $70,000).77  He was sentenced to two years
probation.78
2. Eric Thornton
Eric Thornton, a twenty-four-year old Navy avionics techni-
cian, operated a website called “No Patience” permitting users to
download software such as Adobe Premiere and Adobe Illustra-
tor.79  In one specific instance, a third party downloaded twenty
74 Id.  § 2B5.3, app. 2.
75 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Defendant Sentenced for First
Criminal Copyright Conviction Under the “No Electronic Theft” (NET) Act for
Unlawful Distribution of Software on the Internet (Nov. 23, 1999), available at http:/
/www.cybercrime.gov/levy2rls.htm.
76 Karen J. Bernstein, Net Zero:  The Evisceration of the Sentencing Guidelines
Under the No Electronic Theft Act , 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
57, 63 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Net Zero].
77 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Defendant Sentenced for First
Criminal Copyright Conviction Under the “No Electronic Theft” (NET) Act for
Unlawful Distribution of Software on the Internet (Nov. 23, 1999), available at http:/
/www.cybercrime.gov/levy2rls.htm.
78 Id.
79 Bill Miller, Giveaways Costly for Web Pirate , WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1999, at B1
[hereinafter Miller, Giveaways].
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software programs with a retail value of $9,638.80  Thornton used
the third party software to attract traffic to his website.81  How-
ever, when his Internet access provider noticed the traffic spike,
his provider shut down the website and notified the FBI.82
In December 1999, Thornton pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor
violation of the Act.83  He received five years probation and had
to pay restitution of $9,600.84  In addition, for eighteen months
Thornton’s website described his arrest and conviction.85
3. Brian Baltutat
In October 2000, twenty-one-year-old Brian Baltutat pleaded
guilty to violating the Act.86  He operated a website called
“Hacker Hurricane,” visited by 65,000 people, that offered 142
software programs for downloading.87  Baltutat received three
years probation, 180 days home confinement (including a tether),
restitution, and forty hours of community service.88
4. Jason Spatafore
In December 2000, Jason Spatafore, a twenty-five-year-old
80 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to
Charges Filed Under the “No  Electronic Theft” (NET) Act for Unlawful Distribu-
tion of Software on the Internet (Dec. 22, 1999), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/thornton.htm.
81 Miller, Giveaways , supra  note 79, at B1.
82 Id .
83 Id .
84 Internet Pirate to Pay Restitution , WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2000, at B2.
85 Miller, Giveaways , supra  note 79, at B1.  Specifically, the site said:
All you WaReZ ToadZ out there need to read this!!!
I am out of the WaReZ business.  I have been contributing to the WaReZ
scene for some time. OK! OK! I guess I knew it was illegal—but hell, eve-
ryone was doing it.
One day, I was minding my own business at home when I heard a knock on
my door.  When I opened it, I was staring at gold badges being held by two
FBI agents.  They explained to me that I had been committing federal cop-
yright infringement.  They had been investigating my website with the as-
sistance of the Business Software Alliance.  They had even seized evidence
from my ISP.  Since I was facing a very serious felony charge I came clean
with them.  I was charged and now have a federal conviction.
I didn’t think anyone cared about WaRez distribution on the Internet.
Boy! Was I wrong!
Bernstein, Net Zero , supra  note 76, at 64 n.58.
86 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Man Sentenced in Michigan for Of-
fering Software Programs for Free Downloading on “Hacker Hurricane” Web site
(Jan. 30, 2001), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/baltutatsent.htm.
87 Id .
88 Id .
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computer technician, pleaded guilty to a single violation of the
Act.89  He posted parts of Star Wars Episode I:  The Phantom
Menace  on various websites for downloading and encouraged
people to download the film.90  He received two years probation
and a $250 fine.91
5. Fastlane92
Fastlane was a major warez group.  It had an organizational
structure and held weekly meetings to discuss matters such as
membership and sources of pirated software.93  Fastlane’s web-
sites were not publicly accessible.  The FBI infiltrated Fastlane by
surreptitiously operating a computer site known as Super Dimen-
sional Fortress Macros (SDFM), which members used to ex-
change copyrighted works such as Microsoft operating systems,
application software from Adobe and Corel, and system utilities
from Symantec and McAfee.94  During SDFM’s operation from
January to September 2000, members uploaded over 697
gigabytes of software and downloaded 1.9 terabytes with a total
retail value over $1 million.95
In February 2001, nine Fastlane members were charged with
one count of conspiracy to commit copyright infringement, and
eight of those defendants were charged with one count of com-
89 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty to Internet
Piracy of Star Wars Film (Dec. 15, 2000), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/
spataforeplea.htm.
90 Id .
91 Jason Spatafore, DisMan’s Online Journey , at http://www.spatafore.net/disman/
thephoenixmenace.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
92 The individual Fastlane defendants are: Ryan Breding, aka “river,” 26, of
Oklahoma City, OK; Steve Deal, aka “Doobie” and “Dewbie,” 36, of Trenton, NJ;
Glendon Martin, aka “TeRRiFiC,” 25, of Garland, TX; Shane McIntyre, aka
“Crypto,” 22, of Boynton Beach, FL; James Milne, aka “lordchaos” and “lc,” 19, of
Shawnee, KN; Bjorn Schneider, aka “airwalker,” “a—walker,” and “aw,” 20, of
Falmouth, MA; Kevin Vaughan, aka “DaBoo,” 19, of Raleigh, NC; Tony Walker,
aka “SyS,” 31, of San Diego, CA; Tae Yuan Wang, aka ‘Terry Wang” and
“Prometh,” 19, of Bellevue, WA.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Nine Indicted in Chicago in $1 Million
“Fastlane” Software Piracy Conspiracy (Feb. 16, 2001), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/fastlane.htm.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.  Other Fastlane-associated websites include Sacred Halls (SH) (operated by
Milne), The Good News (TGN) (operated by Martin), and 4:20 (operated by
Vaughan). Id.
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mitting copyright infringement.96  Eight of the nine defendants
pleaded guilty, while a jury found Tony Walker guilty.97  Three
defendants received jail sentences ranging from five to thirty
months.98  The other defendants received probation of three
years.
6. Pirates With Attitude99
Pirates With Attitude (PWA) was another major warez group,
characterized as “the ‘oldest and most sophisticated’ band of
software pirates in Internet history.”100  PWA operated thirteen
FTP servers for software uploading and downloading.101  Its flag-
ship site was Sentinel, located at the University of Sherbrooke in
Quebec, which operated from late 1995 to January 2000.102  Sen-
tinel users obtained the right to download software by uploading
pirated software or by performing other services to the group.103
During Sentinel’s operation, over 30,000 software programs (in-
96 Id . Kevin Vaughan was not charged with committing copyright infringement.
Id.
97 See  United States v. Deal, No. 00-CR-774 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 20, 2000).
98 See id.
99 The individual Pirates With Attitude defendants are:
Convicted members of Pirates With Attitude: Steven Ahnen, aka
“Code3,” 44, of Sarasota, FL.; Diane Dionne, aka “Akasha,” 41, of West
Palm Beach, FL; Christian Morley, aka “Mercy” 29, of Salem, MA;
Thomas Oliver, aka “Rambone,” 36, of Aurora, IL;
Jason Phillips, aka “Corv8,” 31, of Plano, TX; Justin Robbins, aka
“Warlock,” 26, of Lake Station, IN (Microsoft employee).
Robin Rothberg, aka “Marlenus,” 34, of Newburyport, MA; Jason Slater,
aka “Technic,” 31, of Sunnyvale, CA; Mark Stone, aka “Stoned,” 36, of
Fountain Valley, CA; Todd Veillette, aka “Gizmo,” 42, of Oakdale, CT.
Fugitive members of Pirates With Attitude:  Kaj Bjorlin, aka “Darklord,”
Sweden; Mark Veerboken, aka “Shiffie,” Belgium.
Convicted Intel employees:  Tyrone Augustine, 30, of New Rochelle, NY;
Brian Boyanovsky, aka “Boynger,” 26, of Aloha, OR; John Geissberger,
39, of Knoxville, TN; Brian Riley, 32, of Portland, OR; Gene Tacy, 27, of
Hampstead, NH.
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Leader Of Software Piracy Sentenced To
18 Months In Prison (May 15, 2002), available at http://www.cyber crime.gov/
rothbergSent_pirates.htm [hereinafter Rothberg Sentenced Press Release]. See gen-
erally United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 3, 2000); Special
November 1999 Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Rothberg (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(No. 00-CR-85).
100 Darryl van Duch, Eyes on ‘Pirates’ Trial in Chicago, NAT’L L.J. (New York
City), Mar. 26, 2001, at B1.
101 Rothberg Sentenced Press Release, supra  note 99.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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cluding games, MP3 files, operating systems, utilities, and appli-
cations from vendors such as Microsoft, Adobe, Norton, Oracle,
IBM, Lotus, and Novell, some of which were pre-release ver-
sions) were uploaded to Sentinel and downloaded by more than
100 individuals.104  The FBI cracked the case when a confidential
informant helped them gain access to Sentinel.105  PWA mem-
bers claimed their activities were “for fun and entertainment, not
to try to make ourselves rich.”106
Seventeen defendants were indicted in 2000.107  Twelve de-
fendants were PWA members, and five were Intel Corporation
employees who provided computer hardware to PWA for access
rights to the warez library.108
Following the indictments, many defendants negotiated plea
agreements.  After the plea agreements were entered into, the
government contended that the infringements had a retail value
over $10 million.109  A group of defendants jointly moved to limit
the retail value based on expectations defendants formed while
negotiating their plea agreements.  The judge denied the motion
but permitted defendants to rescind their plea agreements (and
thus withdraw their guilty pleas) if they wanted.110  None chose
to rescind.111
A group of defendants then petitioned the court for a lower
retail value, and the court agreed, setting the retail value at
$1,424,640.112  With the retail value set, individual defendants
were sentenced.
Robin Rothberg, the PWA leader, entered a blind guilty
plea113 but requested downward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines.114  The court granted him some relief, and he was
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Pirates With Attitude Proudly Presents Xing Audio Catalyst 2.1 (August 10,
1999), at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7919/NFO/audio2_1.txt [hereinafter
PWA Announcement].
107 Rothberg Sentenced Press Release, supra  note 99.
108 Id.
109 United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-5, 2002 WL 171963, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
4, 2002).
110 United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85, 2001 WL 1654758 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
2001).
111 Rothberg , 2002 WL 171963, at *2.
112 Id.  at *6.
113 A “blind” plea is made without the benefit of a plea agreement.  United States
v. Rothberg, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
114 Id.  Rothberg received a two-level downward revision based on his absence of
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sentenced to eighteen months in prison.115
Another PWA member, Christian Morley, did not negotiate a
plea agreement and instead took his case to trial.  A jury found
him guilty, and he received two years in prison.116  Two other
defendants, Jason Slater and Justin Robbins, received jail
sentences of eight months and seven months, respectively.117
Nine defendants received five years probation (and most of these
defendants also received a $5,000 fine), and two defendants,
Thomas Oliver and Steven Ahnen, each received three years pro-
bation.118  Two defendants, Mark Veerboken and Kaj Bjorlin, are
fugitives.119  In November 2003, two defendants, Jason Slater and
Christian Morley, appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals.120  The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s re-
fusal to instruct the jury on fair use121 and its calculation of retail
value.122
7. Operations Buccaneer, Bandwidth, and Digital Piratez123
Operations Buccaneer, Bandwidth, and Digital Piratez were
major government operations targeting warez groups that, on
December 11, 2001, led to the execution of approximately 100
search warrants both nationally and in Canada, the United King-
dom, Australia, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.124  The raid had a
a profit motive, his extraordinary acceptance of responsibility, and his family circum-
stances. Id.
115 Rothberg Sentenced Press Release, supra  note 99.
116 Id.
117 See  United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 3, 2000).
118 See id.
119 Rothberg Sentenced Press Release, supra  note 99.
120 See  U.S. v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
121 Id.  at 669.
122 Id.  at 671.
123 Although these operations involved the warez community, in some cases the
government’s theory of prosecution did not directly specify that prosecutions were
made under the Act.  Some participants in the larger warez organizations sell warez
for commercial gain, and distributed warez often find their way to commercial
pirates who put the warez on CD-Roms or pay-for-access websites where users pay a
monthly subscription fee or per-download fee.  U.S. Department of Justice,
Operation Buccaneer: Illegal “Warez” Organizations and Internet Piracy (July 19,
2002), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/ob/OBorg&pr.htm [hereinafter DOJ
Warez Organizations].  However, at least some defendants pleaded guilty to
copyright infringement for financial gain based on having received other
copyrighted works. See  Keith J. Winstein, Tresco Receives Three-Year Sentence , The
Tech (MIT), Aug. 26, 2002, available at  http://www-tech.mit.edu/V122/N32/
32tresco.32n.html.
124 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Law Enforcement Targets
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major effect on the warez community globally.125
Operation Buccaneer126 primarily targeted DrinkOrDie, one
International Internet Piracy Syndicates (Dec. 11, 2001), available at  http://www.
cybercrime.gov/warezoperations.htm.
125 Robert Lemos, FBI Raids Cripple Software Pirates , CNET News.com, Dec. 18,
2001, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-277226.html. But see  Farhad Manjoo, Were
DrinkOrDie Raids Overkill? , WIRED NEWS, Dec. 13, 2001, at http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294,49096,00.html (arguing that “DrinkOrDie was small
potatoes in the world of software theft”).
126 Individual defendants prosecuted pursuant to Operation Buccaneer include:
Richard Berry, aka “Flood,” 34, of Rockville, MD (VP and CTO at
Streampipe.com); Anthony Buchanan, aka “spaceace,” of Eugene, OR; Andrew
Clardy, 49, aka “DooDad,” of Galesburg, IL (network technician at Carl Sandburg
College); Myron Cole, aka “t3rminal,” of Warminster, PA; Derek Eiser, aka
“Psychod,” of Philadelphia, PA; Barry Erickson, aka “rads1,” 35, of Eugene, OR
(systems engineer at Symantec Corporation); Hew Raymond Griffiths, aka
“Bandido,” 40, of Bateau Bay, Australia; David A. Grimes, aka “Chevelle,” 25, of
Arlington, TX (computer engineer at Check Point Software); Robert Gross, aka
“targetpractice,” of Horsham, PA; Nathan Hunt, aka “Azide,” 25, of Waterford, PA;
Kent Kartadinata, aka “Tenkuken,” 29, of Los Angeles, CA; Michael Kelly, aka
“Erupt,” 21, of Miama, FL (network administrator for Gator Leasing); Stacey
Nawara, aka “Avec,” 34, of Rosenberg, TX; Mike Nguyen, aka “Hackrat,” 26, of
Los Angeles, CA; Sabuj Pattanayek, aka “Buj,” 20, of Durham, NC; Shane Pitman,
aka “Pitbull,” 31, of Conover, NC; John Riffe, aka “blue” or “blueadept,” 32, of Port
St. John, FL; David Russo, aka “Ange,” 49, of Warwick, RI; John Sankus, aka “eriF-
lleH,” 28, of Philadelphia, PA; Mark Shumaker, 21, of Orlando, FL; Kirk Patrick St.
John, aka “the saint,” 34, of Gilbert, AZ; Christopher Tresco, aka “BigRar,” 23, of
Boston, MA (MIT systems administrator). Press Release, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Warez Leader Sentenced to 46 Months (May 17, 2002), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/sankusSent.htm; U.S. Department of Justice, Operation Bucca-
neer Defendants (Jan. 27. 2003), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/ ob/
Dchart.htm; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Defendant Indicted in Con-
nection with Operating Illegal Internet Software Piracy Group (Mar. 12, 2003),
available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/griffithsIndict.htm; Press Release, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Warwick Man Admits Participation in Software Piracy Network
(Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/russoPlea.htm; Press Re-
lease, U.S. Department of Justice, Former Leader of Razor 1911, the Oldest Game
Software Piracy Ring on the Internet, Sentenced (June 6, 2003), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/pitmanSent.htm; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Online Music Piracy Leader Pleads Guilty (Aug. 21, 2003), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/shumakerPlea.htm; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Valley Man Indicted in International Software Piracy Scheme (Nov. 26, 2003), avail-
able at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/stjohnIndict.htm.
In addition to the foregoing sources, specific sentences are described in United
States v. Berry, No. 02-CR-246 (E.D. Va. filed Apr. 18, 2002); United States v.
Buchanan, No. 02-CR-374 (E.D. Va. filed June 27, 2002); United States v. Clardy,
No. 02-CR-10035 (C.D. Ill. filed Mar. 21, 2002); United States v. Cole, No. 02-CR-
300 (E.D. Va. filed May 8, 2002); United States v. Eiser, No. 02-CR-284 (E.D. Va.
filed May 2, 2002); United States v. Erickson, No. 02-CR-89 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 5,
2002); United States v. Gross, No. 02-CR-299 (E.D. Va. filed May 8, 2002); United
States v. Hunt, No. 02-CR-106 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 14, 2002); United States v. Kelly,
No. 02-CR-112 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 14, 2002); United States v. Nawara, 02-CR-90
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of the oldest and best-known warez groups.127  Founded in Mos-
cow in 1993, the group expanded worldwide in 1995.128  Among
other accomplishments, the group claimed to have released
Microsoft Windows 95 two weeks prior to its commercial re-
lease.129  The group was alleged to have two leaders, two or three
council members, twelve to fifteen staff members, and approxi-
mately sixty-five general members.130
Other groups targeted by Operation Buccaneer included warez
groups involved with creating warez, such as Razor1911, RiS-
CISO, MYTH, and POPZ, and distributing warez throughout the
Internet, such as RequestToSend (RTS), WeLoveWarez (WLW),
and RiSC.131  The groups’ archives contained, in some cases, two
terabytes of pirated software, estimated to have a retail value of
hundreds of millions of dollars.132  However, as part of plea
agreements, Operation Buccaneer defendants admitted that the
retail value was between $2.5 million and $5 million.133
In conjunction with Operation Buccaneer, Mark Shumaker
pleaded guilty to operating the Apocalypse Crew site, which con-
tained pre-released digital music files solicited from DJs and re-
viewers.134  Shumaker also admitted to uploading and
(E.D. Va. filed Mar. 5, 2003); United States v. Nguyen, No. 02-CR-63 (C.D. Cal.
Filed Jan. 18, 2002); United States v. Pattanayek, 02-CR-118 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 20,
2002); United States v. Riffe, No. 02-CR-156 (E.D. Va. filed Apr. 12, 2002); United
States v. Tresco, No. 02-CR-132 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 27, 2002).
127 Fact Sheet, U.S. Customs Service, The “DrinkOrDie” Group: What is It?
Who Are They? What is the DrinkOrDie Group? (Dec. 11, 2001), available at  http: /
/www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2001/1211-01.htm [hereinafter Customs
Fact Sheet].
128 Id .
129 Id .
130 Statement of Facts, at 2, United States v. Tresco (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-CR-
132-A).
131 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OPERATION BUCCANEER:  THE INVESTIGA-
TION (July 19, 2002), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/ob/OBinvest.htm.
132 Id.  A single file server operated by DrinkOrDie, “Fatal Error,” allegedly had
over 900 gigabytes and more than 15,000 titles of software.  Criminal Information at
3, United States v. Tresco (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-CR-132-A).
133 See, e.g. , Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Tresco (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-
CR-132-A); Software Pirate Pleads Guilty , GlobeandMail.com, Apr. 4, 2002, at
http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/RTGAMArticleHTMLTemplate?tf=RT/full-
story_print.html&cf=RT/config-neutral&slug>copy&date=20020404&archive=RT
GAM&site=Technology; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Leader of In-
ternet Software Piracy Organization Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy (Feb. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.cyber-crime.gov/sankusPlea.htm.
134 See  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Online Music Piracy Leader
Pleads Guilty (Aug. 21, 2003), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber-
crime/shumakerPlea.htm; see also  Statement of Facts, United States v. Shumaker,
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downloading infringing files from DrinkOrDie servers, and his
total infringement was stipulated at $40,000-$70,000.135
Of the nineteen Operation Buccaneer defendants sentenced as
of November, 2003, eleven received jail sentences ranging from
eighteen to forty-six months (although at least ten of these de-
fendants had their sentences reduced in exchange for govern-
ment cooperation), three received five years probation, one
received one year probation, and the other four received two
years probation.136
Operation Bandwidth137 primarily targeted Rogue Warriorz
(RWZ), another major warez group.  To make the bust, under-
cover FBI, EPA, and Defense Criminal Investigative Services
agents infiltrated the group’s “Shatnet” site.138  From November
2000 to December 2001, Shatnet contained 8,434 infringing
software programs, 356 infringing movies, and 432 infringing
computer games with a retail value of approximately $7 mil-
lion.139  The group required membership applications and re-
Criminal No. 03-326-A (E.D. Va. 2003), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/ usao/vae/
ArchivePress/AugustPDFArchive/schumakersof082103.pdf.
135 Statement of Facts, Shumaker  (Criminal No. 03-326-A).
136 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OPERATION BUCCANEER DEFENDANTS (Jan.
27, 2003), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ob/Dchart.htm.
137 Individual defendants prosecuted pursuant to Operation Bandwidth include:
John J. Amorosi, aka “Sloanman”, 22, of Falls Church, VA; Wolf Bachenor, aka
Walter Bachenor, aka “Drinfotheif”, “DrinfoTHV”, and “Doctor”, 51, of Park
Slope, NY; David Brandt, aka “Bocephus”, 35, of Wake Village, TX; Alexander
Castaneda, aka “Prentice”, and “Alex”, 20, of Federal Way, WA; Jacob Paul
Clappton, aka “Axxess”, 29, of Livermore, CA; Lukasz Doupal, aka “Luk@s”, 24, of
Brooklyn, NY; Jonathan Dow, aka “Demon Furby”, 34, of Ilion, NY; Jorge Garcia,
Jr., aka “Lh” and “Lordhacker”, 29, of Reddick, FL; Bryan Ray Harshman, aka
“Carrier”, 22, of St. Joseph, MO; Mark Konarske, aka “Markus”, and “Markruss”,
41, of Flat Rock, MN; Timothy J. Lastoria, aka “Waldorf”, 24, of Brecksville, OH;
David Lowe, Ruth Lawton; aka “Dragon”, 41, of Akron, OH; Christopher Mas-
trangelo, aka “Floyd”, 31, of Toms River, NJ; Brad McGourty; Michael Meacham,
aka “Dvorak”, 35, of Barberton, OH; Suzanne Peace, aka “Peaces”, 37, of Lombard,
IL; Lindle Romero, aka “Rahman”, 37, of Houston, TX; Eric Rosenquist; Elisa
Sarino, aka “Elisa”, and “ElisaEGO”, 27, of San Jose, CA; Jeffrey Sasser, aka “In-
ferno”, and Inferno00”, 41, of Charlotte, NC; Peter M. Semadeni, aka “Davinci”,
and “Rev. Wolf”, 28, of Overland Park, KS; Dean Wuestenberg, aka “Xochi”, 44, of
Donahue, IA; Joseph Yano, aka “Jozef”, 34, of Saskatoon, SA; Charles Yurek. See
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Indictments Returned in Las
Vegas Against Software Pirates Nabbed in Operation Bandwidth (June 11, 2002),
available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/bandwidth.htm [hereinafter DOJ Press Re-
lease]; Office of the Inspector Gen., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Semiannual Report to
Congress (May 2003) [hereinafter OIG May 2003]; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (Nov. 2003).
138 DOJ Press Release, supra  note 137.
139 Id.
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corded statistics for group members who had maintained and
moved the greatest number of files.140  As of January 1, 2004, at
least nineteen Operation Bandwidth defendants have pleaded
guilty and at least five of those have been sentenced, all to
probation.
As of January 1, 2004, Operation Digital Piratez has resulted in
two publicized convictions.  First, Christopher Motter was sen-
tenced to two years in federal prison for his oversight of the
warez server “Wonderland,” which allegedly had over forty ac-
tive users and over 5,000 warez with a retail value in excess of
$500,000.141  Second, Daniel McVay pleased guilty to operating a
warez server known as “City Morgue,” which contained 1,000
warez.142  Five additional men have been indicted in connection
with Operation Cyber Sweep (a larger government crackdown
on Internet crime).143
8. William Fitzgerald
In February 2003, William Fitzgerald, a fifty-three-year-old
computer technician for Arlington County, Virginia, pleaded
guilty to one count of criminal copyright infringement.144  He op-
erated a website offering infringing business software from ven-
dors such as Adobe, Autodesk, Macromedia, and Microsoft,145
some of which he uploaded himself.  Fitzgerald stipulated that
140 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Twelve “Operation Bandwidth”
Software Pirates Enter into Group Guildty Plea (Dec. 18, 2003), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/bandwidthPlea.htm.
141 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Iowa Man Receives Two-Year
Prison Sentence in Internet Software Piracy Conspiracy (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.cyberrime.gov/motterSent.htm.
142 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts Man Pleads Guilty
in New Hampshire Software Piracy Conspiracy (Dec. 19, 2003), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/mcVayPlea.htm.
143 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Background on Operation Cyber
Sweep—Examples of Prosecutions (Nov. 20, 2003), available at  http://www.usdoj.
gov:80/opa/pr/2003/November/03_crm_639.htm.  The individual defendants are Jor-
dan Zielin of New York, David Foresman of Lombard, Illinois, Kenneth Woods of
Warrentown, Virginia, Daniel McVay of North Easton, Massachusetts, and John
Neas of Holbrook, Massachusetts.  Mark Hayward, Five Digital Pirates Charged in
Raid, Union Leader (Manchester, N.H.), Nov. 21, 2003, at A20, available at  http://
www.msnbc.com/local/MUL/M340529.asp. Allegedly, Zielen, a Bank of America
employee, set up a warez server on the Bank of America network, and Forseman
operated a warez server at Verio’s data center. Id.
144 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Arlington, Virginia Man Pleads
Guilty to Distributing Pirated Software Over the Internet (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/fitzgeraldPlea.htm.
145 Id.
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the downloaded software was worth between $40,000 and
$70,000.146  He received four months in prison, four months of
home confinement, and a $3,000 fine.147
9. Kerry Gonzalez
In June 2003, Kerry Gonzalez, 24, pleaded guilty to criminal
copyright infringement.  Gonzalez posted an unfinished “work
print” copy of the movie The Hulk  to a movie bootleg website
two weeks prior to the movie’s opening.148  Gonzalez received
the copy from a friend, who had in turn received the copy from
an advertising agency employee.149  A security tag in the movie,
which Gonzalez unsuccessfully tried to remove, allowed the stu-
dio to trace the copy to the ad agency and ultimately to
Gonzalez.150
10. Operation Safehaven
Operation Safehaven151 was a fifteen month investigation into
software privacy.  In April 2003, government agents executed
over twenty search warrants, leading to the seizure of thousands
of CDs and DVDs and various warez servers, including the larg-
est warez site seized in the U.S. to date.152  Four defendants have
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit copyright infringement
and are awaiting sentencing.153
11. Operation Cybernet
Operation Cybernet targeted the individuals operating the
146 Id.
147 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Arlington County Man is Sen-
tenced to Federal Prison for Distributing Pirated Computer Software over the In-
ternet (Apr. 25, 2003), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/fitzgeraldSent.htm.
148 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, N.J. Man Pleads Guilty in Federal
Court to Stealing the Movie ‘The Hulk’ and Posting it on the Internet (June 25,
2003), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/gonzalezPlea.htm.
149 Id.
150 P.J. Huffstutter, How Hulk Crushed the Online Pirate , L.A. Times, June 26,
2003, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hulk26jun26224419,1,139
1001.story.
151 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Investigation Leads to
Prosecution of Internet Software Pirate (Oct. 2, 2003), available at  http://
www.cybercrime.gov/myersPlea.htm.  The individual defendants are:  Travis Myers,
29, of Yakima Wash., Terry Katz, 26, of Yorktown Heights, NY, Walter Kapechuk,
55, of Schenectady, NY, and Warren Willsey, 53, of East Berne, NY.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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Usenet group alt.2600.warez and other FTP sites and IRC chan-
nels.154  The operation produced its first conviction in December
2003 with the guilty plea of James Remy, a forty-year-old from
Washington Township, N.J. who was employed at an East Bruns-
wick graphic design and printing company.155  Remy admitted to
operating a warez server in his home that, from October 26, 2000
through July 24, 2001, was used to download files with a total
retail value of $2,242,712.156  The Department of Justice touted
this as “the largest loss nationwide in a criminal copyright in-
fringement case resulting from conviction of a warez site opera-
tor who is not part of an organized group. . . .157
D. Commentary About the Prosecutions
As discussed in Section 1(C), the Act targeted individuals like
LaMacchia; that is, individuals who used the Internet to dis-
tribute infringing software on a commercial scale but without a
profit motive.  Seven of the nine prosecutions match those objec-
tives and therefore are directly consistent with the Act’s intent.
Spatafore and Gonzalez did not engage in commercial scale in-
fringement, but their activities closely resemble that of warez
traders, and thus they still fit comfortably within the Act’s in-
tended scope.  Therefore, the prosecutions to date appear gener-
ally consistent with Congress’ objectives for the Act.158  Some of
the Operation Bandwidth defendants have stipulated only to
downloading a single copy of software.159  While these prosecu-
tions would be troubling in the abstract, in context it is likely that
these stipulations were part of a plea bargain to avoid greater
liability for RWZ’s behavior.
This conclusion contrasts with the widespread predictions of
problems that the Act would create.  For example, some com-
mentators expressed concern that aggressive prosecutors would
154 See  Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Man Admits to Distribution of
Pirated Movies, Music, Computer Software and Games Worth Over $2.2 Million
(Dec. 8, 2003), available at  http://www.cybercrime.gov/remyPlea.htm.
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 Id.  (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie).
158 Cf . 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (saying that “[i]f the practical effect of the bill turns out to be draconian,
we may have to revisit the issue”).
159 Brad McGourty stipulated to downloading a copy of Microsoft Money, and
Charles Yurek stipulated to downloading a copy of Windows XP.  OIG May 2003,
supra  note 137, at 21-22.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 25  1-MAR-04 11:55
A Road to No Warez 393
abuse their discretion to win convictions.160  One commentator
predicted that prosecutors would bring weak felony cases to get
quick misdemeanor plea bargains.161  While prosecutors have
been successful in getting defendants to plea bargain,162 none of
the cases appear particularly weak.
Commentators also worried that de minimis  offenders would
be prosecuted.163  Indeed, Sen. Hatch specifically clarified that
the Act should not reach de minimis  infringements by educators
who believe their actions constitute fair use164 or individuals who
merely execute software programs.165  However, none of the
cases are fairly characterized as de minimis  (other than perhaps
the Operation Bandwidth cases described above), and the DOJ is
reluctant to pursue such cases, especially when defendants are
sympathetic or act without profit motives.166
160 Despite reservations about the Act’s breadth, Sen. Hatch supported the Act
because he was willing to rely on “the good sense of prosecutors and judges” to
identify defendants consistent with the Act’s purposes. Id.
161 See  Andrew Grosso, The Promise and Problems of the No Electronic Theft
Act , Comm. of the ACM, Feb. 2000, at 23, 26, available at  http://delivery.acm.org/
10.1145/330000/328243/p23-grosso .pdf?key1=328243&key2=878343660-1&coll=
GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=13119240&CFTOKEN=57162232. Cf . Henry M.
Gladney, Digital Intellectual Property:  Controversial and International Aspects , 24
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 65 (2000) (discussing how defending a felony prose-
cution under the Act is complex and tedious, thus inducing defendants to plea
bargain).
Although not directly echoing this argument, the House Report evidences a desire
to give prosecutors extra tools to negotiate plea agreements. See H.R. REP. NO.
106-339, at 8 (1997) (explaining that the financial thresholds were set low to allow
the DOJ to extract plea bargains from felony defendants). Cf. DOJ IP CRIMES
MANUAL, supra  note 56, § III(A) (“Misdemeanor copyright infringement is another
option for prosecutors.  It can be a useful charge in cases where scale of the crime is
difficult to prove with specificity . . . .”).
162 Only two defendants, Christian Morley of PWA and Tony Walker of Fastlane,
have gone to trial.
163 See  H.R. Rep. No. 105-339, at 8 (1997) (saying that de minimis  infringers
should not be punished, giving the example of a teenager softlifting a software pro-
gram for a younger sibling); 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13,
1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that earlier versions of the Act’s “language
was so broad that the net could be cast too widely . . . so that minor offenders . . .
would be swept in”); Loren, supra  note 22, at 870 (fearing that prosecutors would
interpret the Act as a mandate to pursue small volume copiers).
164 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
165 Id.  at S12690.  Senator Hatch says that, “under a literal reading of the bill, the
ordinary purchaser of computer software who loaded the software enough times in
the 180-day period to reach the more-than-$1,000 threshold may be a criminal.  This
is, of course, not the intent of the bill.” Id.
166 See  United States Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions,
United States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85, 2002 WL 171963, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4,
2002) (noting that the government did not prosecute the hundreds of individuals
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Similarly, the ACM believed the Act criminalized activities
protected by fair use.167  However, none of the defendants to
date could legitimately claim fair use.168  Furthermore, this con-
cern may never have been legitimate at all.169  Fair use remains a
complete defense to criminal copyright infringement,170 and
some have suggested that any infringement made without com-
mercial advantage or private financial gain is presumptively fair
use.171  Even without that presumption, a good faith but incor-
rect belief that a use was fair may negate willfulness.172
Some commentators expressed concern that the Act would
detrimentally affect special communities, specifically universities
and juveniles.  Regarding universities, the ACM predicted that
universities would remove copyrighted works from the Internet
to avoid prosecution.173  In practice, while universities are con-
stantly evaluating ways to minimize their liability for content
posted by students and faculty members, the Act does not appear
who only downloaded warez distributed by PWA); Hearings , supra  note 9, at 49
(statement of Kevin DiGregory) (“I am not sure that we—that we want to be in a
position to Federally prosecute that particular individual who decides to take that
one piece of copyrighted material and send it to a friend or a relative.”); Hearings ,
supra  note 1 (statement of Kevin DiGregory); DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note
56, § III(E)(4) (advising prosecutors not to pursue technical violations of the Act if
the defendant is sympathetic).
167 See  Simons, supra  note 49.
168 Cf.  United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (calling a claim
that warez trading is fair use “preposterous”).
169 See  Dan Goodin, Scientists Want Net Law Veto , CNET news.com, Nov. 25,
1997, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-205787.html (quoting Professor Pam Samu-
elson as saying that the assertion about fair use “may be a slight overstatement” and
attorney Jonathan Band as saying “[i]f there was fair use before [the Act], there will
be after”).
170 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2]; A. HUGH SCOTT, COM-
PUTER AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME:  FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 271-72
(2001); Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes , 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 235,
254 (1999).
171 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(C)(3); Loren, supra  note 22,
at 887; James E. Neuman, Copyright Violations Face Criminal Exposure , N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 13, 2001, at S3.  In 1984, the Supreme Court said that noncommercial use was
presumptively fair, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984),
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/464_US_417.htm, but effec-
tively abandoned this presumption in 1994, see  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc,
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994), available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/ html/92-
1292.ZS.html.
172 See infra  Section IV(A).
173 Simons, supra  note 49; see also  Goodin, supra  note 169 (quoting Professor
Pam Samuelson as saying, “If there is any question of copyright infringement, insti-
tutions will be inclined to avoid the whole problem and take things down, even when
years of litigation would have found the use fair.”).
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to have led to significant efforts by universities to remove con-
tent from the Internet.174  Instead, universities curtailing infring-
ing online activities are more concerned about bandwidth
usage175 or civil liability176 than criminal liability.  Meanwhile,
prosecutors have not shown any interest in prosecuting universi-
ties, even when NET Act defendants used school computer
networks.
Some commentators also believed that the Act would dispro-
portionately impact juveniles based on an assumption that many
warez traders were minors.177  While NET Act defendants have
been as young as nineteen, no minors have been prosecuted.  In
fact, the DOJ will suspend prosecutions when a potential defen-
dant is a juvenile,178 which may explain the lack of prosecutions.
Further, the stereotype that warez traders are primarily juveniles
may be a fallacy.179
174 See  University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, New Internet Copyright Legislation
Signed , Fac./Staff Newsl. (Univ. of Wis.-Milwaukee), Jan. 23, 1998, at http://
www.uwm.edu/News/report/old/jan98/Legal_Affairs.html (stating that the NET Act
“does not impact existing UWM policy”). Cf.  Georgia Harper, Liability for the
Wrongful Acts of Publishers (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.utsystem.edu/
ogc/intellectualproperty/publia.htm (discussing how the University of Texas may be
liable for publishing tortious content, but not advising its constituents to stop
publishing).
175 John Faust, Note, Digital Music:  Educational Issues , 2001 BYU Educ. & L.J.
367, 387 (citing Georgia Harper, University Liability for Student Infringements  (last
updated Sept. 6, 2001), at  http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intelectualproperty/nap-
ster.htm) (“Some [universities] have already blocked access for reasons unassociated
with legal liability, most notably, because of the bandwidth use associated with
searching for and transferring large files.”).
176 See  Katie Dean, School Blocks Out File-Trading , WIRED NEWS, May 2, 2003,
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58698,00.html (explaining that the New
Jersey Institute of Technology blocked all Internet file-sharing to eliminate the risk
of being sued by the recording industry and to avoid the hassle of complying with
the high volume of legal demand letters); see also  Scott Carlson, New Jersey Institute
of Technology Prohibits File Sharing on its Campus , CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1,
2003, available at http://chronicle.com/cgi2-bin/printable.cgi?articleHTtp://chron-
icle.com/free/2003/05/2003050101t.htm. .
177 See  Stephanie Brown, The No Electronic Theft Act:  Stop Internet Piracy! ,
9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. LAW & POL’Y 147, 162-63 (1998) (citing Wendy
Leibowitz, Kid Stuff:  Judges Having Hard Time with Computer Crime, Sentencing
Standards Aren’t Clear-Cut , NAT’L L. J., July 6, 1998, at A1); see also  Tetzlaff, supra
note 10, at 107 (saying teenage boys are “archetypal” warez traders).
178 See Hearings , supra  note 51 (statement of Kevin DiGregory). See generally
DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(E)(4) (describing a prosecutor’s limited
choices when prosecuting juveniles).
179 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (“These are not pimply teenag-
ers . . . not one member is younger than 20; Clickety-Clack is the youngest at 23.
Most are 30-plus.  Champion uploader Digital has been happily married for 22 of his
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Finally, some commentators have predicted that copyright
owners would take advantage of the longer criminal statute of
limitations (five years instead of three) to obtain remedies after
the civil statute of limitations expired.180  So far the prosecutions
to date do not evidence such an effort, as most cases appear to
have been brought—and often resolved—within a matter of
months.  Further, with the evidentiary challenges of prosecuting
cases involving Internet-based infringement, prosecutors proba-
bly will not pursue stale cases.
III
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT
Based on the previous section’s analysis of the prosecutions to
date, one might infer that the Act has been a success.  However,
the Act has not conformed the behavior of warez traders or had
any real effect on piracy generally.  Therefore, its relative lack of
positive benefit prompts the question as to whether the Act’s
benefits outweigh its costs.
A. The Act’s Effect on Piracy
Piracy rates cannot realistically be measured accurately.  For
example, to measure the Act’s effect on piracy, the proper analy-
sis would compare current piracy rates against what the rate
would be without the Act, an obviously impossible inquiry.
Nevertheless, Congress relied on piracy statistics in its deliber-
ations, so it is appropriate to start an efficacy analysis there.  Spe-
cifically, the House Report cited a statistic that worldwide
revenue losses to software piracy were $11 billion in 1996,181 a
statistic repeated by several legislators during the floor de-
bates.182  This number came from a study conducted by the Inter-
national Planning and Research Corporation (the “IPRC
46 years . . . . Founding member Abraxas has three kids, one over 18.”).  The average
PWA defendant was thirty-five years old, and the average age of Operation
Bandwidth defendants was around thirty-two years old.
180 See  Heneghan, supra  note 44, at 31 n.54; Loren, supra  note 22, at 848;
Neuman, supra  note 171, at S3.
181 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4 (1997).
182 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12692 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Cannon); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9887 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Delahunt).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 29  1-MAR-04 11:55
A Road to No Warez 397
Study”) and commissioned by the Business Software Alliance
(“BSA”) and the Software and Information Industry
Association.183
Unfortunately, Congress’s reliance on this statistic is indefen-
sible.  First, the $11 billion statistic measured worldwide losses,
which was irrelevant to assessing a law applying to activity in the
United States.  The U.S. piracy statistic in the IPRC Study was
$2.4 billion,184 still a large number but eighty percent less than
the cited statistic.
Second, the IPRC Study’s methodology185 feigns credibility
through complexity that obscures guesswork, subjective judg-
ments, and unreliable data inputs.  The IPRC Study computes
lost revenues by considering the number of computers shipped
into a country, guessing why those computers were purchased,
and then guessing the number of business software programs that
should have been licensed based on the country’s technological
maturity and the amount of software licensed in the United
States at that stage of maturity.  The amount of actual legitimate
sales is then estimated using confidential data self-reported by
BSA member companies, grossed up to reflect those member
companies’ percent of the U.S. market and then grossed up again
to reflect the U.S. market’s percent of the worldwide market.
This methodology is not credible because it uses multiple lay-
ers of estimates and uses unreliable data self-reported by mem-
ber companies.  Also, the IPRC Study ignores country-by-
country differences in price elasticity for software.186  Further,
the IPRC Study modeled U.S. piracy using U.S. historical num-
bers as the baseline, creating an inherent circularity in the com-
putation of piracy in the United States.187
Third, the IPRC Study reported business  software losses, and
183 INT’L PLANNING & RESEARCH CORP., SEVENTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 6 (2002), available at  http://www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/
admin/2002-06-10.130.pdf [hereinafter IPRC Study].  The Software Publishers Asso-
ciation, which co-sponsored the 1996 IPRC Study, subsequently became the
Software and Information Industry Association.
184 Id.
185 See id.  at 8-9.
186 See id.
187 Starting in 2001, the IPRC prepared a state-by-state analysis of piracy which
avoids this circularity but raises many of the same methodological questions. See
Int’l Planning & Research Corp., U.S. Software State Piracy Study (2003).
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softlifting was the biggest cause of this.188  Softlifting means
“purchasing a license for software and loading it onto additional
computers, thus exceeding the license.”189  Commercial softlift-
ing was already criminalized prior to the Act,190 so the Act did
not really implicate this activity.  If Congress thought warez trad-
ing was the key problem, Congress should have considered how
much revenue was lost to warez trading, but it did not.
Not surprisingly, subsequent versions of the IPRC Study re-
veal that piracy did not decrease from 1997 (the Act’s passage)
through 1999 (after the Act had been on the books for a full
year).  Worldwide revenue losses to software piracy increased
from $11.3 billion in 1997 to $12.2 billion in 1999,191 and software
piracy in the United States increased from $2.4 billion in 1997 to
$3.2 billion in 1999.192
Further, other empirical evidence suggests that piracy covered
by the Act has gone up since its passage.  A BSA study showed
that warez trading sites increased from 100,000 in 1997 to 900,000
in 1999.193  Another BSA survey from May 2002 showed that
more than eighty percent of all Internet users who have
downloaded commerical software have downloaded software
188 See Hearings , supra  note 9, at 77 (statement of Greg Wrenn, Senior Corporate
Counsel, Adobe Systems, Inc.).
189 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 97 (statement of Sandra A. Sellers).
190 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(B)(5) (stating that “repro-
duction of unauthorized copies of a work for use within a single company is clearly
an infringement for financial gain and commercial advantage . . . the purpose of the
infringement is to save money by not purchasing additional authorized copies or
licenses; the savings constitutes a financial gain for the infringer.”).
191 IPRC Study, supra  note 183, at 7.  Note that piracy decreased in the IPRC
Study from 1999 to 2001.  The IPRC Study cites six factors contributing to a long-
term worldwide decrease in software piracy: (1) software companies provide legiti-
mate copies into developing markets faster, (2) software companies provide more
user support internationally, (3) software prices have gone down, (4) industry groups
have led education and civil enforcement efforts, (5) legitimate licensing practices
increasingly support business credibility, and (6) there are more criminalization and
government efforts to protect software. Id.  at 2-3.  Also, the IPRC model is very
dependent on the number of computer units sold.  If the units sold decreased, as
often occurs in economic downturns, could that have contributed to the piracy de-
crease as much or more than any of the cited factors?
192 Id . at 6.
193 Stanley A. Miller II, Software Piracy:  When Using a Mouse Makes You Smell
Like a Rat , Milwaukee J. Sentinel, May 30, 2000, at 1M [hereinafter Miller, Rat].
BSA’s website now claims that there are an estimated two million warez pages. See
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY INITIATIVES TO PROTECT CREA-
TIVE WORKS, at http://www.bsa.org/usa/policy/copyright/creative-works.phtml (last
visited Nov. 17, 2003).
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without paying for it, and twenty-five percent of users who
download software never  pay for it.194  And assuming peer-to-
peer (P2P) file-sharing violates the Act, piracy has taken off since
the Act’s passage; an estimated fifty-seven million Americans use
P2P file-sharing services195 and forty-two percent of those indi-
viduals have burned a music CD rather than purchase it.196
While this evidence alone does not prove the Act’s lack of effi-
cacy, empirical evidence does not indicate that the Act has
curbed infringements.  Because multiple factors or considera-
tions can influence piracy rates, there are a variety of hypotheses
about why the Act may not effectively curtail copyright
infringement.
1. Inadequate Enforcement and Penalties
Some have argued that the DOJ has not adequately enforced
the Act,197 the implicit concern prompting Rep. Coble to hold
the Oversight Hearings.  However, Rep. Coble should not have
been surprised.  The House Report indicates that the Congres-
sional Budget Office expected that the Act “would enable DOJ
to prosecute several  additional copyright infringement cases each
year.”198  While no prosecutions had been brought prior to the
Oversight Hearings, the prosecutions brought since then meet or
exceed this projection.
However, enforcement remains unpredictable, so infringers
194 IPSOS PUBLIC AFFAIRS, QUANTIFYING ONLINE DOWNLOADING OF UNLI-
CENSED SOFTWARE (2002), at  http://www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/admin/2002-05-
29.118.pps [hereinafter Ipsos Survey].
195 See  Jon Healey, Labels May Face Risk in Piracy Suits , L.A. Times, June 27,
2003, at 3(1) (observing that an estimated four million people are using KaZaA at
any one time, collectively making 800 million files available).
196 Press Release, Ipsos-Reid, File-Sharing and CD Burning Remain Steady in
2002: IPSOS (Feb. 20, 2003), available at  http://www.ipsos-reid.com/media/dsp_dis-
playpr.prnt.cfm?ID_to_view=1743.
197 See  Kevin M. Kelly, Comment, The MP3 Challenge:  Has Congress Effectively
Shielded the Music Recording Industry from Internet Copyright Piracy? , 18 Temp.
Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 163, 189 (2000) (“The lack of prosecutions under the NET Act
destroys the deterrent effect of the statute.  The Department of Justice must actively
seek individuals involved in Internet copyright piracy and prosecute those individu-
als in a high profile atmosphere. Only then will a true deterrent be created.”); see
also  Rep. Howard Coble, How Should the Government Protect Copyrights in Light
of Technology? , ROLL CALL, Mar. 27, 2000, at 14 (“A criminal statute that is not
used by prosecutors and does not carry a credible threat of imprisonment is unlikely
to be much of a deterrent, and the experience with the NET Act to date demon-
strates the truth of this statement.”).
198 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 6 (1997) (emphasis added).
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may not have a meaningful fear of being prosecuted.199  And
some hypothesize that the Act does not sufficiently deter offend-
ers because it lacks adequate penalties, either because the Sen-
tencing Guidelines are too lax200 or too complicated and
unpredictable.201
2. Ignorance of the Act
The DOJ predicted that a few well-publicized prosecutions
would have a strong deterrent effect.202  But despite the publicity
given to those prosecutions, the Act may not be well known.203
Even warez traders, who generally know that their activities are
illegal,204 may not understand the legal consequences of their
actions.205
199 See  Team Report, supra  note 60, at 12 (“While the NET Act focuses only on
the [swiftness of punishment], discussions with industry representatives made clear
that the uncertainty of any punishment also plays a significant role in the widespread
failure of deterrence.”); see also  Jim Wagner, The Hunt for Warez , In-
ternetnews.com, Apr. 19, 2002, at 1, at http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/arti-
cle.php/10_1012961 (quoting Bob Kruger, BSA’s Vice President of Enforcement, as
saying, “Why do people continue to break the law? . . . For one, they don’t think
they’ll get caught. . . .”). But see  Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Prop-
erty Laws:  A Psychological Perspective , 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 220-22
(Fall 1996-Winter 1997) (arguing that criminal deterrence only works when the
probability of getting caught and punished clears a minimum threshold which crimi-
nal laws rarely reach; but even then, certainty of punishment plays only a small role
in legal compliance).
200 See  Bernstein, Net Zero , supra  note 76.
201 See  Neuman, supra  note 171, at S3 (“The sentencing process [is] fraught with
unpredictability and complexity.”).
202 See Hearing , supra  note 51 (statement of Kevin DiGregory).
203 See  Gladney, supra  note 161, at 64-66.  Gladney cites a non-scientific survey
he conducted showing widespread ignorance of the law. Id.  at 63 n.65.
204 See  Statement of Facts, United States v. Pattanayek at 2 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No.
02-118-A) (“Defendant knew that his participation in [DrinkOrDie] and RTS was
illegal, and he was aware of past federal prosecutions against similar groups.”); Tet-
zlaff, supra  note 10, at 115 (quoting a warez trader as saying, “We KNOW what we
are doing is wrong”); Granade, Warez , supra  note 8 (quoting an abandonware
webmaster as saying, “I knew it was illegal.”); Marc Saltzman, Flashbacks for Free:
the Skinny on Abandonware , Gamespot.com, at http://gamespot.com/gamespot/ fea-
tures/pc/abandonware/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
205 See generally  Shahram A. Shayesteh, High-Speed Chase on the Information
Superhighway:  The Evolution of Criminal Liability for Internet Piracy , 33 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 183, 217-18 (1999) (discussing warez traders’ misunderstandings about the
efficacy of disclaimers and fair use).
As a typical example of warez traders’ bravado and naivete´, consider the boast of
NXSonic, a warez site operator, who says that warez site operators have “talked
with lawyers and know the boundaries” and therefore have concluded no criminal
liability attaches so long as “sites do not have actual software on the sites.”  Wagner,
supra  note 199, at 2.  However, the DOJ claims that merely linking to infringing
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3. Socialization
As individuals become increasingly required to make copies to
function in our society, they become socialized to ignore copy-
right law.206  This socialization becomes reinforced with low inci-
dents of enforcement,207 the quasi-anonymity inherent in being
one of millions of people committing infringement every day,208
and the perceived inequity between high software prices and low
manufacturing and distribution costs.209  Thus, piracy may in-
software can be criminal. See DOJ IP CRIMES MANUAL, supra  note 56, § III(E)(5)
(discussing the theories under which linking can be prosecuted); accord  David Gold-
stone and Michael O’Leary, Novel Criminal Copyright Infringement Issues Related to
the Internet , U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., May 2001, at 33, 38, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab4903.pdf.
206 See  Tyler, supra  note 199, at 224 (“[t]he predominant strategy is to create a
legal entitlement and then seek to enforce that entitlement with a threat.  The result
is widespread noncompliance with the law.”); Wagner, supra  note 199, at 1 (citing
Bob Kruger, BSA’s Vice President of Enforcement, as saying that people continue
to break the law because “they think it’s no big deal”). See generally  Eric Schlchter,
The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace:  Why Copyright Law Could Be
Unimportant on the Internet , 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 34-38 (1997) (discussing
how users become socialized to accept copyright infringement), available at  http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol12/Schlachter/html/reader.html.
207 See Hearing , supra  note 51, at 7 (statement of Batur Oktay, Corporate Coun-
sel, Adobe Systems, Inc.) (“Left unprosecuted, these types of websites—which are
brazen about their own illegality—send the message that Internet pirates can oper-
ate with impunity, that there is no effective enforcement, that intellectual property
protection on the Internet is unavailable.”), available at  http://www.house.gov/judi-
ciary/okta0512.htm; Heneghan, supra note 44, at 45 (stating that “the practice of
targeting a few visible scapegoats only serves to diminish people’s respect for the
law”); Jason Hoppin, The Crackdown on IP Crime , THE RECORDER, Dec. 3, 2001
(quoting a criminal defense attorney as saying that selective enforcement of criminal
copyright cases breed contempt for the law), available at http://www.law. com/re-
gionals/ca/stories/edt1203a.shtml.
208 See  Tyler, supra  note 199, at 223 (“Little actual risk accrues to people who free
ride on the efforts of others by copying articles, CDs or tapes.  Hence, the structural
opportunities for free riding are high in this area, making effective deterrence diffi-
cult.”); Jefferson Graham, Students Put Their Own Spin on Downloading Music ,
USA Today, Apr. 10, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/ news/
techpolicy/2003-04-10-music-share_x.htm (quoting a file-sharing student as saying
that he still downloads music, despite publicized lawsuits against other students, be-
cause “[t]he record labels will never be able to stop downloading.  It’s too wide-
spread.”); Stephen Granade, Beelzebub Interview , BRASSLANTERN.COM, at http://
brasslantern.org/community/interviews/beelzebub.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2003)
(quoting a warez trader as saying that “[t]here’s no way that the BSA et al could
hope to prosecute every single individual who has ever downloaded a piece of illegal
software from the internet.  It clearly would not be economically viable . . . .”) [here-
inafter Granade, Beelzebub].
209 See  IPSOS Survey, supra  note 194 (stating that eighty percent of Internet
users feel that “it makes no sense for software companies to charge consumers . . .
hundreds of dollars per user license for programs that cost them only a few pennies
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crease because users become accustomed to routinely commit-
ting infringement and feel moral ambiguity about the justness of
copyright law.
4. Imprecise Targeting
A final hypothesis is that the Act does not accomplish its goals
because its provisions are not precise enough to change the be-
havior of the targeted infringer groups.  To better analyze how
the Act affects potential infringers, it is helpful to categorize in-
fringers into different subgroups, as explored in the next section.
B. Classes of Pirates
During the 1997 Subcommittee Hearings, representatives of
the Software Publishers Association and BSA discussed several
types of software piracy:  softlifting, counterfeiting, unauthorized
loading of software onto hard drives by computer manufacturers
and dealers, unauthorized software renting, and hacking/warez
trading.210  It remains unclear why so much hearing time was
spent on these various types of infringers,211 when all but the
hacking/warez trading type were criminalized prior to the Act.
Even the hearing’s brief discussion about hacking/warez trad-
ing was filled with imprecision.  For example, the Software Pub-
lishers Association representative defined this group as a “type
of pirate, the consummate ‘hacker’ or ‘warez’ aficionado.”212
Her reference actually covers three heterogeneous groups, each
of whom warrant more discussion:
to reproduce”).  Although this sentiment is felt strongest towards the software in-
dustry, many consumers have similarly strong feelings that the recording industry is
morally unjust. See  Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students Over
Music Sharing , N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2003, at A1 (discussing student hostility to-
wards the music industry), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?
res=F1081EFD355E0C708EDDAD0894DB404482.
210 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 97 (statement of Sandra A. Sellers). See generally
Business Software Alliance, Types of Piracy, at  http://www.bsa.org/ usa/antipiracy/
Types-of-Piracy.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).  While this list describes only
software infringement, other infringer subgroups include fans/enthusiasts (i.e., an
individual who builds a fan website), archivists/historians, critics, and P2P file-shar-
ers who download MP3 files for personal enjoyment.
211 For example, the Software Publishers Association’s representative focused her
presentation at the 1997 Subcommittee Hearing on softlifting by United States gov-
ernment agencies. Hearings , supra  note 9, at 87-91 (statement of Sandra Sellers).
Even the legislators were confused by the seeming irrelevance of this digression. See
id.  (statement of Rep. Cannon) (confirming with Ms. Sellers that the Act did not
address her government softlifting concerns).
212 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 99 (statement of Sandra A. Sellers).
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Commercial Pirates.  Commercial pirates infringe copyrighted
works for profit.213  This subgroup includes counterfeiters, manu-
facturers and dealers who load unauthorized software onto hard
drives, and software renters.  Because by definition they commit
commercial infringement, their behavior was criminalized prior
to the Act.214
Crackers.  Intrusive crackers obtain unauthorized access to pri-
vate Internet spaces, such as private areas to download copy-
righted material.215  The Act does not specifically address this
group, although intrusive cracking is covered by other criminal
laws, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,216 the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act,217 and numerous state anti-
trespass or computer crimes laws.218
Circumvention crackers defeat mechanisms installed by copy-
right owners to limit copying or use of the copyrighted work.219
As discussed below, circumvention cracking is an integral part of
the warez community, but neither the Act nor the 1997 Subcom-
mittee Hearings addressed it.  Congress subsequently criminal-
ized circumvention cracking in the DMCA.220
Warez Traders .  As mentioned previously, warez traders are
enthusiasts who trade or distribute warez as an avocation.  But
even this description lumps together several subgroups:
• Warez distributors are organized groups that prepare and dis-
tribute warez for non-commercial reasons.  To handle a high
volume and rapid turnaround times, group members often
213 See  David M. Hornik, Combating Software Piracy:  The Softlifting Problem , 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 377, 378 (1994).
214 See  17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000).
215 Crack , Webopedia.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2003), at  http://www.webope-
dia.com/term/c/crack.html.
216 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 18/
1030.html.
217 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000), available at  http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 18/
2701.html.
218 See, e.g. , 3 Ian C. Ballon, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 51.09 (2001).
219 See  Omar J. Pahati, Digital Pirates and the “Warez” Wars , AlterNet.org, Jan.
24, 2002, at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=12283 (“[G]angs, usually
made up of software developers and technologists, work to reverse the protections
built into software products, enabling others to distribute the products free of
charge.  Make no mistake—these gangs are not your rogue technophiles from the
MS-DOS days, but a large, highly organized movement interested in ‘cracking’ every
piece of software that sees the light of day.”).
220 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 17/
1201.html.
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specialize in a particular skill.221  First, a supplier (often a
software vendor insider) delivers a new software program to a
“drop site,” a computer where other group members can ac-
cess it.  Second, a group member “cracks” the software by re-
moving or circumventing any copyright protection
mechanisms.  Third, other group members test the cracked
software to make sure it still works and then “pack” the
software by dividing it into easy-to-distribute packets.  Fi-
nally, the cracked software is delivered to another drop site,
from which members disseminate it throughout the Internet.
Warez prepared by these distribution groups often contain an
information file (“.nfo file”) which, among other things, de-
scribes which group claims credit for the distribution.222
• Warez collectors are individuals who collect warez.  They
want to build the biggest or most impressive collection of
warez,223 and they display their collections as a way to win
peer approval.
• Warez downloaders are individuals who download warez
for some reason other than collection, such as to evaluate
or actually use the warez.  Often warez downloaders are
enthusiasts looking for the newest and coolest software.224
Some warez downloaders also like getting something for
221 See  DOJ Warez Organizations, supra  note 123. See generally Lemos, supra
note 125; Adam L. Penenberg, Where Do You Want to Pirate Today?, FORBES, Aug.
8, 1997, available at http://www.forbes.com/1997/08/08/column.html; The Truth
About Piracy , at  http://www.defacto2.net/web.pages/gameover.1 (last visited Nov.
18, 2003) [hereinafter Truth Article].
222 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10.
223 See  Team Report, supra  note 60, at 16 (explaining that “some persons collect
‘trophy’ copies of software or video games simply to ‘prove they can do it’ and to
add to their collection”); McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (“The more high-
end and toolbar-tastic the app, the better”; quoting a warez collector as saying, “You
end up collecting programs you don’t need and never use.  Just so you can say, ‘I’ve
got this or I’ve got that.’  Or ‘My version of Photoshop is higher than yours.’”); id .
(explaining that collectors “feel unfulfilled unless they’ve swelled their coffers by at
least one application a day . . . .’  It’s an obsessive game.  We see it every day—
people begging for something to ‘finish their collection.’”); Granade, Beelzebub ,
supra  note 208 (describing “warez hoarders” who “accumulate a collection of the
most expensive software packages obtainable” which can be “worn like a badge to
reflect a person’s skill as a warez hunter”).
224 Stephen Poole, PC Pirates , CNET GameSpot.com, at 5 (on file with the Ore-
gon Law Review) (quoting a warez downloader as saying “I love getting my hands
on some new game that everyone has been hyping and giving it a run, or having
someone say to me, ‘Man, did you see that game?  It looks real cool—I can’t want
till it comes out,’ and being able to reply ‘Yeah, I have it, but it’s not that great.’”).
Cf.  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 107 (explaining that “the getting and the having mean
more than the using”); Granade, Beelzebub , supra  note 208 (“The thrill of the chase
is just as important as achieving the goal of finding what you are searching for.”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 37  1-MAR-04 11:55
A Road to No Warez 405
nothing.225  In contrast, many distributors and collectors
never use the warez they have.226
• Abandonware traders are individuals who trade out-of-
print software or games.227  Some abandonware traders
characterize themselves as archivists or historians;228
others are just enthusiasts.  Abandonware traders often
seek to distance themselves from normal warez traders229
because they believe their actions do not deprive a copy-
right owner of economic value.230  However, from a legal
standpoint, abandonware traders should be treated the
same as warez traders under the Act.231
C. What Motivates Warez Traders?
Understanding the psychology and motivation of warez traders
can help assess the likelihood that the Act will properly conform
their behavior.
1. Ego
Fundamentally, almost all warez traders are motivated by ego.
For warez distributors, “[t]he whole point . . . is to get the pirate
225 See  Granade, Warez , supra  note 8, at 2.
226 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 104 (explaining that “warez enthusiasts gener-
ally acquire large libraries of software, most of which they have no desire or ability
to ever use”); McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10; David Pogue, Some Warez
over the Rainbow , MACWORLD, Oct. 14, 1997, at 3, available at http://
preferhman.net/texts/underground/hacking/MACWORLD%20AGREEZ!!!.txt (ex-
plaining that “most warezers don’t even use what they download” and quoting an
industry representative as saying that “[t]hese kids have huge 3GB hard drives full
of compressed software they can’t even use, high-end stuff they don’t have the
manuals for”).
227 See  Granade, Warez , supra  note 8, at 5. See generally  Saltzman, supra  note
204.
228 See  Greg Costikyan, New Front in the Copyright Wars:  Out-of-Print Computer
Games , N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/
00/05/circuits/articles/18aban.html; Granade, Warez , supra  note 8, at 6 (quoting an
abandonware webmaster as saying, “Without abandonware sites, these games will be
lost.  I don’t want them to be lost.”); Saltzman, supra  note 204 (saying abandonware
site operators “do it out of love for oldies, and they think of themselves more as
game historians than criminals”).
229 See  Granade, Warez , supra  note 8 (suggesting that abandonware enthusiasts
view warez traders as anarchists).
230 See  Costikyan, supra  note 228 (explaining that “publishers provide no legal
way for gamers to get older games; the market is too small to justify the effort.  So
gamers feel justified in making vintage games available, despite the legal risks.”).
231 However, abandonware traders may have a better basis to claim fair use be-
cause, by definition, their activities do not affect the work’s market.
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program released and distributed before any other group.”232  A
distributor’s success is measured by releasing warez as quickly as
possible before anyone else, with the crowning achievement be-
ing a “0-day” release, a release made before the program’s offi-
cial commercial release.233  Fast distributions of impressive
software evidences the individual or group’s collection, cracking,
and distribution skills,234 contributing to a reputation for speed
or quality cracking.235
To the participants, warez distribution and collection is a game
or a competition.236  Warez traders seek to win fame and respect
by playing the game better than their peers.
2. Thrill of the Illicit
Many warez traders derive a thrill from doing something il-
232 Jason Farnon, Evolution of a Warez D00d , at  http://www.flashback. se/archive/
AWA-001.TXT (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
233 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (“The ultimate bartering tools are
zero-day warez. . . . The prizes for good zero-day warez vary; you may get instant
download status on a particular server, logins and passwords for exclusive FTP sites,
or admission to the ranks of a powerful cartel like the Inner Circle.”).
234 See id.  (stating that to Warez distributors, “sticker prices mean[ ] nothing—
except inasmuch as more expensive programs are harder to crack, and that makes
them the most desirable, spectacular trophies of all. . . . The more the manufacturers
harden a product, with tricky serial numbers and anticopy systems, the more fun it
becomes to break.”); McCandless, Warez World , TELEPOLIS (July 26, 2001), at http://
www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/9170/1.html (quoting warez cracker TAG as saying
“[software manufacturers] really don’t want their stuff copied which makes it all the
more tasty for someone with a reputation to keep up.”) [hereinafter McCandless,
Warez World].
235 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (“NFO files do more than brag or
supply installation instructions; they testify that the ware is a bona fide release, guar-
anteed to work.  And this is more than just posturing; a group’s reputation is para-
mount.  Each release is painstakingly beta-tested.  These are their products now,
their labors of love. . . . Nobody wants to be accused of being ‘unprofessional.’”);
Customs Fact Sheet, supra  note 127 (“Earning an online reputation as the fastest to
steal, ‘crack,’ and release high-quality pirated software over the Internet is the most
important to them.”).
236 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (warez trading is “a game, a pis-
sing contest; a bunch of dicks and a ruler.”); McCandless, Warez World , supra  note
234 (quoting warez trader Diamond as saying “We are in it for the same reason
some people try to do 200 foot jumps on a bike.  It’s all about saying we are cool and
showing off.”); Penenberg, supra  note 221 (“Like winning a pinball tournament or
turning over the scoreboard on Missile Command .  It’s about ego and ephemeral
glory, about being ‘the man’. . . .”); Truth Article, supra  note 221 (“One of the
[warez] scene’s main motives that drive people to make this their hobby, almost
their lives, is ego and competition.  Competing groups push the members in the
group to try to be #1 in the scene.”).
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licit.237  According to one warez site operator, “deep down every-
one is a little scared [of criminal prosecution] but that is also
what keeps us going.”238
3. “Software Should Be Free”
Almost all warez traders believe software should be free, and
they view themselves as benefactors for the oppressed, like a
cyber–Robin Hood.239  Specifically, many warez traders view
software manufacturers as oppressive and the software industry
as the enemy.240  With the “software should be free” philoso-
phy,241 many warez traders bitterly oppose commercial pirates
who, like software manufacturers, commit the sin of charging for
what should be free.242
237 See  Wagner, supra  note 199, at 2; Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 108 (“The thing
that makes [warez trading] exciting is the forbidden quality of its prizes, the values
and restrictions that come from outside the computer in the ‘real’ world of stores
and cops and federal legislation.”).
238 Id.  (quoting warez site operator NXSonic).
239 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 114 (quoting a warez trader as saying “[i]t is the
role of pirated software to . . . make the technology and information that will deter-
mine the future available to everyone.”); Miller, Rat , supra  note 193, at 1M (saying
that warez traders view “setting up a warez Web site is a noble thing to do” and
quoting warez trader HippieGuy as saying, “It’s like Robin Hood.  Taking from the
rich and giving to the poor.”); Customs Fact Sheet, supra  note 127.
240 See  McCandless, Warez World , supra  note 234 (warez trading is “an act of
bloodless digital terrorism.  It’s ‘Fuck you, Microsoft.’”); McCandless, Warez Wars ,
supra  note 10 (“In warez world, the software companies are the criminals”);
Granade, Beelzebub , supra  note 208 (quoting a warez site operator as saying “warez
will live on forever in one form or another until something is done to redress the
problems of high prices and bug ridden, section [sic] rate software.”); Granade,
Warez , supra  note 8 (“Some people view warez use as a form of protest against
software companies, a way to avoid what they see as exploitative pricing policies.”).
241 See  Miller, Rat , supra  note 193, at 1M (“Software pirates . . . said that all
software should be free . . . . ‘Software companies make plenty of money off busi-
nesses.  The everyday guy should be able to use any program for free.’”); Wagner,
supra  note 199, at 2 (quoting a warez site operator as saying “people [trade warez]
because we are tired of paying outrageous prices for software”).  However, some
warez traders say they support paying for software when the perceived value is com-
mensurate with its price. See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (quoting a
warez distributor as saying “We do advocate buying your own software if you really
like it and use it heavily.”).
242 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 104 (“the practice of charging any form of actual
money is frowned upon by most members of the warez scene.”); Lee Gomes,
Software Makers Turn Small-Time Pirates into Political Prisoners , WALL STREET J.,
Nov. 11, 2002, at B1 (“Selling any of the programs is anathematic.”); McCandless,
Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (quoting several warez distributors who say they do not
seek money, including one warez distributor saying, “We’re not in it for the money.
I would never sell something I got from warez.”); Granade, Beelzebub , supra  note
208 (“a pirate profits by acquiring software by whatever means and selling it on for
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Historically, warez traders had a norm that to download warez,
you must return something.243  However, as the community’s
self-perception as cyber–Robin Hoods matures, some warez
“traders” distribute warez freely, without any expectations in
return.244
4. Sense of Community
Finally, warez trading permits traders to participate in a com-
munity and form friendships.245  Many warez traders are social
misfits in the physical world, but online they find kindred spir-
its.246  As one warez trader said, “[w]arez d00dz want to belong.
They have been shunned by everyone, and thus turn to cyber-
space for acceptance.”247
their own personal gain, but this, simply put is not the warez way; it goes completely
against the scene’s ethic of free software.”); Truth Article, supra  note 221 (“Some
people sell copies of the latest software for profit; the [warez] scene for one simple
fact also scorns this.”).
243 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 106 (“The server operator makes the contents of
his collection available for all to see.  He asks that anyone who wishes to obtain
some of these files first transmit to him some useful file he does not yet have. . . .
This isn’t just a matter of greed on the administrator’s part, it also reflects a group
ethic.  If you would take, so also must you give.”); McCandless, Warez Wars , supra
note 10 (“On the freewheeling IRC chat forums, warez are no longer gifts—they’re
trade goods . . . there are no free lunches—every piece of software has to be paid
for, in software”).
244 See  Granade, Beelzebub , supra  note 208 (quoting a warez site operator as
saying, “No one who is involved in the scene trades anymore, nor do they profit
from uploading, instead warez is freely distributed to whoever wants it, all you have
to do is ask nicely or loiter in the right places.”).
245 See id.  (“[The warez scene] is a club like any other, full of enthusiasts who
share thoughts, ideas and friendships over a virtual medium. . . . Searching for warez
gives you the chance to interact and form friendships with people from all over the
globe, which otherwise you would not have the opportunity to do.”); Former
DrinkOrDie Member Chris Tresco Answers, Slashdot.com, Oct. 4, 2002, at http://
interviews.slashdot.org/interviews/02/10/04/144217.shtml?tid=123 (discussing how a
warez trader tried to quit his group several times, “but imagine a bunch of guys/gals
sitting around talking all day and suddenly you stop showing up . . . You start to miss
that type of interaction.”); McCandless, Warez World , supra  note 234 (quoting
warez trader Diamond as saying, “You also make a lot of friends in the scene and
that’s the best part for me.”).
246 See  Farnon, supra  note 232 (“Warez d00dz get along so well because they can
relate to each other so damn well.”); Penenberg, supra  note 221 (quoting a warez
trader as saying, “If they can’t make it in real life, they get into warez to try and be
cool.”). Cf.  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (discussing how warez traders
posted obituaries for traders who had been busted, saying things like “We feel for
ya!”).
247 Farnon, supra  note 232.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 41  1-MAR-04 11:55
A Road to No Warez 409
D. Implications of Warez Traders’ Motivations
The Act implicitly assumes that warez traders are rational ac-
tors who, like any others, will curtail behavior in response to
threatened punishment.  Indeed, building on that assumption, a
number of commentators have argued that only criminal punish-
ment will motivate warez traders,248 and some have complained
that the Act’s penalties are too lenient to truly motivate.249
But it is wrong to assume that warez traders respond to this
threat system so directly.250  Warez traders do have standards
and codes of ethics,251 but they are indifferent to rules they do
not believe in.252  It is unrealistic to expect that they will conform
to externally-imposed rules.  More likely, criminal sanctions may
only stroke warez traders’ egos by increasing the impressiveness
of their actions; the greater the punishment, the bigger the
248 See Hearings , supra  note 9, at 20 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights) (stating that for individuals acting without a profit motive, “civil reme-
dies are less likely to serve as an effective deterrent.  Therefore, criminal sanctions
are needed to deter these individuals from causing serious harm to the value of
copyrighted works.”), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju48724.000/hju48724_0.htm [hereinafter Peters Testimony]; Bernstein, Net Zero ,
supra  note 76, at 58-59 (“There is no other way to deter online criminal infringement
acts other than jail time.”).
249 See  Karen J. Bernstein, The No Electronic Theft Act:  The Music Industry’s
New Instrument in the Fight Against Internet Piracy , 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 325, 326
(2000) (stating that “the only way to fend off the non-profit Internet pirate is by
increasing prison sentences for Internet pirates through the NET Act.”); Andrea L.
Foster, Lawmakers Demand That Colleges Crack Down on Illegal File Sharing ,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 27, 2003, available at http://chronicle.com/cgi2-bin/
printable.cgi?articleHTtp://chronicle.com/free/2003/02/2003022701t.htm. But see
Tyler, supra  note 199 (arguing that increased sanctions play little role in motivating
legal compliance).
250 See  Tyler, supra  note 199, at 234 (stating that “reliance upon threats of punish-
ment to enforce intellectual property laws is a strategy that is likely to be
ineffective.”).
251 See  McCandless, Warez Wars , supra  note 10 (describing the warez traders’
“commandments” as “[g]ood manners, good use of bandwidth, and good warez.
Give unto others as you would have them give unto you.”).  Other “cardinal sins”
include distributing virus-infected files, posting a “me too” comment, posting partial
releases, posting a release in a single file instead of smaller pieces, and posting the
URLs of secret FTP sites.  McCandless, Warez World , supra  note 234.  Warez
groups have also established standard protocols for the acceptable size and format
of warez releases, Poole, supra  note 224, at 10, and the release of “iso” files, http://
www.defacto2.net/web.pages/iso.1/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
252 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 115 (quoting a warez trader as saying “We
KNOW what we are doing is wrong, yet we continue not because we have a need for
the software we use, but because we want it.”).  Also consider the perspectives of a
warez trader: “It’s just that the moral impact of stealing doesn’t hit us.  We feel no
remorse, usually.”  Truth Article, supra  note 221.
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thrill.253  If so, Congress’s efforts may counterproductively en-
courage, not inhibit, warez trading.
Criminalizing warez trading may also reinforce the warez trad-
ers’ Robin Hood self-perception as do-gooders fighting unjust
laws.  As the laws become more stringent, warez traders may be-
lieve them increasingly unjust, in turn increasing the self-per-
ceived moral justification for their actions.
Criminal sanctions also deepen warez traders’ social bonds to
each other.  In an “us vs. them” world (where the “them” is
software companies, the government, or any form of authority),
warez traders already perceive themselves as outcasts.  Criminal-
ization further reinforces their status as outlaws having more in
common with each other than with the rest of society.  Once so-
cialized into this community, warez traders have trouble leaving
it because it becomes the only place where they feel like they
belong.
Thus, the Act may very well fail at its core objective of deter-
ring warez traders.  Quite possibly, the Act may be counter-
productively encouraging warez trading.
E. The Act’s Coverage Overlaps With Other Factors
Inhibiting Piracy
Finally, the Act’s efficacy is weakened because other laws and
systems duplicitously overlap with the Act and may have greater
impact on infringers’ behavior than the Act.  Most obviously,
copyright owners can sue infringers, which can be very effective
at shutting down infringers.  Some government officials believe
infringers who are indifferent to money damages (because they
are judgment-proof) cannot be motivated by civil lawsuits,254 but
copyright owners can shut down these infringers through
injunctions.
Just the mere possibility of being sued can deter infringers.
253 Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 108 (“There’s a feeling of empowerment that comes
with beating the system.  The thrill rises with the stakes—there are real government
agents who could conceivably come and arrest you.”).
254 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (“For persons with few assets, civil liability is not an adequate deterrent.”);
Declan McCullagh, DOJ to Swappers:  Law’s Not on Your Side , CNET NEWS.COM,
Aug. 20, 2002, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-954591.html (citing a DOJ official
as saying that civil infringement actions do not adequately intimidate judgment-
proof file-sharers) [hereinafter, McCullagh, Swappers].
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 43  1-MAR-04 11:55
A Road to No Warez 411
Certainly average Americans are highly swayed by the threat.255
Thus, the record industry’s recent lawsuit against P2P file-sharers
has affected both file-sharing activity and Americans’ psychology
about file-sharing.256  Even blase´ warez traders can be influenced
by the threat of a lawsuit.257  For example, in 1999 the BSA
civilly sued twenty-five individuals for trading warez in chat
rooms, after which BSA enforcement official Bob Kruger
claimed to “have seen an immediate impact on piracy in IRC
channels as a result of the lawsuit.”258  Solely on the basis that
civil remedies are highly effective at curbing infringement, some
have questioned the need for the Act at all.259
255 Graham, supra  note 208 (citing how students on at least fifteen campuses pul-
led down file-sharing services in response to the recording industry’s lawsuits against
students operating mini-Napsters); Harmon, supra  note 209, at A1 (describing two
students who took down their mini-Napster systems after four other students got
sued, including a University of Maryland student who took down his system within
an hour of hearing the news because “I don’t think I was doing anything wrong . . . .
But who wants to face a $98 billion debt for the rest of their lives?  I was scared.”);
Stanley A. Miller II & Dan Egan, College Students Bond Over File-Swapping Suit ,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 4, 2003, at A1 (quoting a Michigan Tech official as
saying, “The cease-and-desist notice is enough of a wake-up call.”), available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/gen/may03/138411.asp?; Winstein, supra  note 123
(citing a confident music archive site operator who removed Metallica songs from
his site after Metallica threatened civil suit against Napster users).
Ultimately, to obtain real deterrence of civil infringers, copyright owners may
have no alternative to civil enforcements.  This may explain the record industry’s
massive campaign targeting individuals who offer substantial amounts of music
through P2P file-sharing networks. See  John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swap-
pers , CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 8, 2003, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-3-
5072564.html?.
256 RIAA Chief Says Piracy Lawsuits Have Changed Public Awareness , 67 BNA
PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. 130 (2003).
257 See  Gomes, supra  note 242, at B1 (PWA’s Robin Rothberg claimed he would
have stopped trading based on a civil infringement action); Granade, Beelzebub ,
supra  note 208 (quoting a warez site operator saying that he “would be only too
willing to co-operate with [prosecutors or plaintiffs] in taking down the site before
any legal proceedings took place” and that he hopes that prosecutors or copyright
plaintiffs would contact him “before making any rash decisions”); Mark Moor, Steal-
ing It Softly—The Pirate Mr X , HERALD SUN, June 4, 2003, at http://herald-
sun.news.com.au/printpage/0,5481,6536520,00.html (describing a warez collector
who plans to stop because of increased enforcement efforts).
258 Warez Chatters Busted:  Piracy , Wired News, Nov. 17, 1999, at  http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294.32616,00.html.
259 On this basis, several commentators have questioned the need for the Act.
See  Heneghan, supra  note 36, at 44; David Loundy, The Good, Bad, Ugly of Copy-
right Law Rewrites , CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 8, 1998, at 5, available at  http://
www.loundy.com/CDLB/1998-Copyright.html (arguing that the LaMacchia loophole
should have been closed through civil enforcement actions, not new legislation);
Declan McCullagh, The Copyright Conundrum , CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 14, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2010-1071-961818.html (“Before the NET Act became law,
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Of course, having a strong civil liability scheme may not be
enough.  In some cases, criminal laws provide a useful or even
necessary complement.  Criminal penalties (especially jail time)
can have strong deterrent effects, and the power to initiate a
criminal prosecution can make enforcement easier by creating
the ability to obtain search warrants260 and bring cross-border
enforcement actions.261  And, to the extent infringements create
social externalities, the government may be the optimal plaintiff
to bear the enforcement costs.  But even if those reasons are suf-
ficient to warrant criminal coverage for infringement, other crim-
inal laws overlap with the Act,262 particularly with respect to
large-scale warez trading:
• Large-scale warez distributors like PWA, Fastlane, and
DrinkOrDie improperly use third-party computer servers
in a manner that likely violates the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act263 and possibly analogous state computer
crimes laws.
• When Intel employees exchanged company-owned com-
puter hardware for the right to access the PWA warez li-
brary, they likely committed theft or analogous crimes.
• In 1998, anti-circumvention laws264 criminalized circum-
vention cracking, which most large-scale warez distributors
systematically do.
• Distribution of pre-release software or other corporate
proprietary information could violate the Economic Espio-
nage Act.265
copyright holders already had the power to sue suspected infringers in civil court,
and if the NET Act were to be repealed, they would retain that right.”) [hereinafter
McCullagh, Conundrum]. See generally  Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Cop-
yright Infringement:  An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory , 83
B.U. L. REV. 731, 752 (discussing idea that criminal sanctions should be a last resort,
but legislators often act without considering the efficacy of civil legislation).
260 Cf . Hoppin, supra  note 207 (citing how search warrants allowed an intellectual
property plaintiff to get materials that would not have been feasibly obtained
through discovery).
261 See  McCullagh, Swappers , supra  note 254 (quoting the DOJ’s John Malcolm
as saying that the government can enforce copyrights better than private plaintiffs
because the government can conduct multi-jurisdictional and international
investigations).
262 See  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law , 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505 (2001) (discussing that federal criminal laws routinely overlap). See gener-
ally DOJ IP CRIMES MANUAL, supra  note 56, § III(A) (describing other criminal
laws that protect copyrighted material beyond 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000)).
263 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), available at  http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 18/
1030.html.
264 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000), available at  http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 17/
1201.html.
265 See  18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/
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• Attaching .nfo files to warez could violate the DMCA pro-
vision protecting the integrity of copyright management
information.266
In addition to civil copyright infringement and other criminal
laws, other private actors regulate infringement covered by the
Act.  Internet access providers often proactively shut down sys-
tematic infringers before the copyright owner or government is
even aware of the problem.267  Universities are also playing an
active role in mitigating infringement, promptly cooperating with
takedown notices from copyright owners268 and subjecting stu-
dent infringers to the university’s disciplinary system.269  In addi-
uscode/18/pIch90.html.  The Economic Espionage Act has been used to prosecute at
least one misappropriator who acted without commercial advantage or private fi-
nancial gain. See  U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, L.A. Man Pleads
Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets for Stealing Information to DirecTV ‘Smart Card’
(Apr. 28, 2003) (discussing the prosecution of Igor Serebryany, a student who stole
DirecTV anti-piracy technology trade secrets from the law firm he worked at and
posted them to hacker websites), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber-
crime/serebryanyPlea.htm.
266 See  17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2000), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/us-
code/17/1202.html.
267 See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 112 (“A warez pirate is much more likely to get
in trouble with his ISP than with the SPA itself.  In fact, this is how most pirates get
shut down.”).  For example, University of Oregon network administrators caught
and shut down Jeffrey Levy based on his high bandwidth usage.  Andy Patrizio, DOJ
Cracks Down on MP3 Pirate , WIRED NEWS, Aug. 23, 1999, at http://www.
wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,21391,00.html.
268 See  Scott Carlson, Recording Industry Sues 4 Students for Allegedly Trading
Songs Within College Networks , CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 4, 2003 (discussing
how schools like Michigan Tech and Princeton routinely cooperate with the record-
ing industry), available at  http://chronicle.com/free/2003/04/2003040401t.htm; Letter
from Curtis J. Tompkins, President, Michigan Technological University, to Cary
Sherman, President, Recording Industry Association of America (Apr. 4, 2003)
(describing all of the steps Michigan Tech has taken to cooperate with the RIAA),
available at http://www.admin.mtu.edu/urel/news/media_relations/95/.
269 See  John Borland, Navy Disciplines Students for Downloading , CNET
NEWS.COM, Apr. 15, 2003, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1025-996990.html (discuss-
ing how the Naval Academy disciplined eighty-five students for illegal file-sharing);
Justine Maki, University Cracks Down on File Sharing , DIGITAL COLLEGIAN (Penn
State), Apr. 21, 2003, at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2003/04/04-21-03tdc/
04-21-03dnews-04.asp (discussing how 220 Penn State students were referred to Judi-
cial Affairs because of file-sharing); Miller & Egan, supra  note 255 (quoting a Michi-
gan Tech official as saying that there was a zero recidivism rate for students
prosecuted for file-sharing through the University disciplinary system).
Even the mere threat of discipline under a university system can be effective at
conforming student behavior. See  Adam VanOsdol, Students Forced to Delete Mu-
sic , INDIANA DAILY STUDENT, Jan. 30, 2003, at http://www.idsnews.com/story.php?
id=14352  (quoting a file-sharing student who received a university letter instructing
her to delete the files or she would be referred to the judicial board: “I was very,
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 46  1-MAR-04 11:55
414 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
tion, copyright owners also use technological protections to curb
infringement.270
IV
WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE ACT CRIMINALIZE?
Section III discussed the Act’s efficacy.  Section IV now con-
siders the other half of the equation—what social costs does the
Act create?
A. Criminalization of Everyday Activities
It is generally undesirable policy to make every American a
criminal.  Even copyright owner industry groups agree that Con-
gress should not “accidentally tak[e] a large percentage of the
American people, either small business or citizens, into the gray
very scared.  I thought I was going to jail. . . . I erased everything I had and deleted
the program.”).
270 See  Andrew Ross Sorkin, Software Bullet is Sought to Kill Musical Piracy ,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, at A1 (discussing such technological techniques as “spoof-
ing,” redirection, “freeze,” “silence” and “interdiction”); see also Brian Krebs, On-
line Piracy Spurs High-Tech Arms Race , WASH. POST, June 26, 2003 (discussing
other technological efforts), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/
A34439-2003Jun26 .
The recording industry has used instant message technology to scare file-sharers
and automated scripts to notify Internet access providers of alleged file-sharers. See
John Borland, RIAA to File Swappers:  Let’s Chat , CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 29, 2003,
at  http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-998825.html.  One such instant message read:
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT WARNING: It appears that you are of-
fering copyrighted music to others from your computer.  Distributing or
downloading copyrighted music on the Internet without permission from
the copyright owner is ILLEGAL.  It hurts songwriters who create and
musicians who perform the music you love, and all the other people who
bring you music.
When you break the law, you risk legal penalties.  There is a simple way to
avoid that risk:   DON’T STEAL MUSIC, either by offering it to others to
copy or downloading it on a ‘file-sharing’ system like this.
When you offer music on these systems, you are not anonymous and you
can easily be identified.  You also may have unlocked and exposed your
computer and your private files to anyone on the Internet.  Don’t take
these chances.  Disable the share feature or uninstall your ‘file-sharing’
software.
This warning comes from artists, songwriters, musicians, music publishers,
record labels and hundreds of thousands of people who work at creating
and distributing the music you enjoy.  We are unable to receive direct re-
plies to this message.
Joris Evers, Recording Industry Warns File Swappers Via IM , MACCENTRAL.COM,
Apr. 30, 2003, at http://maccentral.macworld.com/news/2003/04/30/riaawarning/.
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area of criminal law.”271  Yet, the Act appears to do just that.
The everyday activities potentially covered by the Act are
breathtaking in scope and ubiquity.  Our digital society requires
us to make copies—lots of copies—to function productively,272
and all of those copies infringe if they involve third-party copy-
righted works.  Thus, the Act makes every file uploaded to the
Internet or email forwarded to a friend the potential basis of
criminal prosecution.  The process of committing little acts of in-
fringement is endemic in our lives, and all of those are, in theory,
subject to scrutiny should we ever be prosecuted.273
But perhaps the most problematic everyday infringing activity
is P2P file-sharing.  As discussed above, fifty-seven million
Americans use P2P file-sharing services, and the P2P file-sharing
software programs KaZaA and Morpheus—the market leaders
after Napster’s shutdown—have collectively been downloaded
over 360 million times.274
Yet, P2P file-sharers likely violate the Act.  Some users
download enough files to clear the Act’s financial thresholds.
But even lower-activity users automatically store files in a shared
directory where other users can download the files, and some
users altruistically choose to share infringing files.275  In either of
those cases, any actual downloads made could also count toward
the financial threshold.  If enough files are uploaded or
downloaded, the user may clear the criminal financial thresholds.
271 Hearings on S. 893 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Ad-
min. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary  (1992) (statement of the Vice President
and General Counsel, Computer and Communications Industry Association); see
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994) (“It is not clear
that making criminals of a large number of consumers of computer software is a
result that even the software industry would consider desirable.”) (footnote omit-
ted), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/US_v_LaMacchia.html.
272 See  John Leland, Beyond File-Sharing; a Nation of Copiers , N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2003, § 9, at 1.
273 See  Nimmer on Copyright, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2] (noting the frequency
with which ordinary Americans have to make decisions under the Act).
274 CNET DOWNLOAD.COM, at  http://download.com.com/3101-2001-0-1.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003); see  Fred von Lohmann, New Music Rules Are Needed , DAILY
PRINCETONIAN, Apr. 14, 2003 (“More Americans have used file-sharing software
than voted for the President.”), available at  http://www.dailyprincetonian. com/
archives/2003/04/14/opinion/7930.shtml.
275 For a discussion about the sociological factors behind P2P file-sharing, see gen-
erally  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks (John M. Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper, 2d Series No. 162, 2002), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
Lawecon/WkngPprs_151-175/162.ls.file-swapping.pdf.
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Alternatively, irrespective of a user’s quantity of downloads or
uploads, every file-sharer may be criminally infringing due to the
expanded definition of “financial gain,” which could apply to the
sharer’s receipt of other copyrighted works through the file-shar-
ing system.276
There is little debate that P2P file-sharing could be criminal,277
and Congress certainly has made it clear that it wants P2P file-
sharing prosecuted.  In Summer 2002, nineteen members of Con-
gress, led by Sen. Joseph Biden, wrote to U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcroft requesting that the DOJ make a priority of using
criminal copyright laws to curtail infringement via P2P net-
works.278  The letter specifically requested that the DOJ prose-
cute P2P network operators “who intentionally facilitate mass
piracy” and individuals who “intentionally allow mass copying
from their computer” over P2P networks.279  In response, the
DOJ pledged to bring criminal prosecutions against individual
file-sharers, but no timetable has been set.280
276 See  McCullagh, Conundrum , supra  note 259 (arguing P2P file-sharing is pun-
ishable under the Act because trades are made with an expectation of receipt of
value); Declan McCullagh, Perspective:  The New Jailbird Jingle , CNET NEWS.COM,
Jan. 27, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2010-1071-982121.html [hereinafter McCul-
lagh, Jingle]. Cf . A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that, based partially on the amended definition of financial gain, P2P
file-sharing was “commercial” for purposes of a fair use analysis), available at http://
www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/239_F3d_1004.htm.
277 This position has been taken by, among others, an aide to Rep. Cornyn and
RIAA chief Hilary Rosen. See  Declan McCullagh, Share “True Crime,” Do the
Time , CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 12, 2003, at http://www.news.com.com/2100-1026-
5106684.html (quoting a Cornyn aide); Declan McCullagh, Congress Targets P2P
Piracy on Campus , CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 26, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2102-
1028-986143.html (quoting Hilary Rosen).  Other commentators who have con-
cluded that P2P file-sharing violates the Act include Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A
Nation of Felons?:  Napster, the NET Act, and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Shar-
ing , 50 AM. U. L. REV. 473, 531 (2000), available at http://www. wcl.american.edu/
journal/lawrev/50/bailey.pdf, and Shayesteh, supra  note 205, at 218 n.237. Cf.
Gomes, supra  note 242, at B1 (“Someone trading software on post-Napster services
like Kazaa could, if they have enough software on their machine, be treated just like
Mr. Rothberg.”). But see  McCullagh, Jingle , supra  note 276 (quoting Prof. Jessica
Litman as saying that automated storage of files in a shared directory may not con-
stitute willfulness).
278 Letter from Senator Joseph Biden et al. to U.S. Attorney General John Ash-
croft (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.politechbot.com/docs/congress.
p2p.letter.081002.pdf; see  Declan McCullagh, File-Swapping Foes Exert P2P Pres-
sure , CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 13, 2002, at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
949533.html.
279 Biden, supra  note 278.
280 McCullagh, Swappers , supra  note 254 (quoting John Malcolm, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General).  In March 2003, Mr. Malcolm reiterated the commitment to
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In the interim, Congress expresses continued frustration about
P2P file-sharing.  In February 2003, at a hearing of the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property, some Subcommittee members, including
Rep. Waters and Rep. Weiner, reinforced their view that P2P
file-sharing is illegal.281  Subcommittee members also blasted uni-
versities for not doing more to catch and penalize students en-
gaged in P2P file-sharing and for failing to turn over violators to
the government for prosecution.282
Even more recently, in July 2003, Rep. Conyers introduced the
Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Secur-
ity (ACCOPS) Act of 2003,283 which would remove any doubt
about whether P2P file-sharing is illegal by criminalizing willful
infringement through P2P file-sharing where a user makes even
one file available for sharing.  Congress’s point could not be
clearer:  it hates P2P file-sharing and wants it stopped.
Despite Congress’s exhortations, no P2P file-sharer has been
prosecuted yet.  More generally, there are a number of reasons
why prosecutors may choose not to prosecute average Americans
for everyday and common activities:  the activity could be fair
use, the activity may not clear the financial thresholds, evidence
may be too difficult to collect, or the infringement may not be
committed “willfully.”284
Specifically, the willfulness standard plays a critical role in dis-
tinguishing between legal and criminal activity285 and thus war-
prosecute P2P file-sharers. See International Copyright Piracy:  A Growing Problem
with Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary ,
108th Cong. 103 (2003) (statement of John Malcolm), available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju85643.000/hju85643_0f. htm.  In August 2003,
Mr. Malcolm yet again reiterated a desire to prosecute P2P file-sharers but observed
that it was hard to meet the thresholds and obtain the right evidence. See  Jon Hea-
ley, Man Pleads Guilty to Web Music Bootlegging , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at C1.
281 See  Declan McCullagh, Congress Targets P2P Piracy on Campus , CNET
NEWS.COM, Feb. 26, 2003, at  http://news.com.com/2102-1028-986143.html.
282 See  Foster, supra  note 249.
283 See generally  http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/CONYER_069.PDF.
284 See generally  Brown, supra  note 177, at 153-64.
285 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(E)(5) (“A key question in
these developing criminal cases under these circumstances is evidence of willful-
ness.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2] (“[T]he only bar
against an overzealous prosecutor criminalizing nearly every copyright infringement
case lies in the other prerequisite to criminal liability: willfulness.”); Coblenz, supra
note 170, at 250 (“Willfulness [is] the only significant difference between criminal
and civil infringement.”); Loren, supra  note 22, at 846 (explaining that the willful-
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rants more discussion.  The U.S. Supreme Court has
characterized willfulness as “‘a word of many meanings’ whose
construction is often dependent on the context in which it ap-
pears.”286  Yet, Congress did not define willfulness in the Act.
This omission was not an oversight.  The word’s definition was
discussed extensively in the legislative history, and some legisla-
tors wanted to define it explicitly.287  Rep. Goodlatte proposed,
but later withdrew, an amendment to the Act defining willfulness
as requiring “intent  to violate another person’s copyright.”288
The House Report explains that Goodlatte’s definition was op-
posed because the definition’s reference to “intent” might
change the current understanding of willfulness and “the major-
ity view on the matter is that ‘willful’ conduct necessitates
‘intent.’”289
But, intent of what?  The House Report’s comment obscures
the central issue.  Instead, the House Report says merely that the
Act “will not  change the current interpretation of the word as
developed by case law and as applied by the Department of Jus-
tice.”290  In floor debates, Sen. Leahy repeated those words and
continued, “nor does [the Act] change the definition of ‘willful’
as it is used elsewhere in the Copyright Act.”291
Accepting these statements at face value,292 this legislative his-
ness requirement is the only practical requirement distinguishing civil and criminal
copyright infringement).
286 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 204 (1998) (quoting Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943)).
287 See  H.R. Rep. No. 105-339, at 10 (1997); see also  Letter from the American
Association of Law Libraries et al. to Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House
Judiciary Committee (Oct. 3, 1997) (urging the Act should include the phrase “in-
tent to violate another’s copyright”), available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/
aallwash/lt100397.html.
288 H. REP. NO. 105-339, at 10 (1997).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 143 Cong. Rec. S12,689, S12,690 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).  This statement is
ambiguous because arguably it tries to reference how the term is used in the civil
copyright context.  For discussion about differences in the word’s usage in civil and
criminal copyright contexts, see Ting Ting Wu, The New Criminal Copyright Sanc-
tions:  A Toothless Tiger? , 39 IDEA 527 (1999), available at http://www.idea.pierce
law.edu/articles/39/39_4/16.Wu.pdf.
292 This qualifier is necessary because at least two legislators expressly said they
were overturning case law pertaining to willfulness.  Reps. Coble and Goodlatte said
that the Act rejects cases holding that evidence of reproduction and distribution of
copyrighted works, by itself, can establish willfulness.  143 CONG. REC. H9883,
H9884 (statement of Rep. Coble); accord  143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (statement
of Rep. Goodlatte).  Elsewhere, Rep. Coble said that “minority case law from the
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tory still does not clarify matters because, as discussed below, the
existing case law was inconsistent.293  Further, where the legisla-
tors did explain their views on the word, the articulations were
also inconsistent and suggest a split of opinion between the
House and Senate.294
In the Senate discussions, Sen. Hatch articulated a traditional
definition of willfulness as “the intent to violate a known legal
duty.”295  In contrast, in the House discussions, Rep. Coble ar-
ticulated a more lax definition of willfulness:
It should be emphasized that proof of the defendant’s state of
mind is not required.  The Government should not be required
to prove that the defendant was familiar with the criminal cop-
yright statute or violated it intentionally.  Particularly in cases
of clear infringement, the willfulness standard should be satis-
fied if there is adequate proof that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard of the rights of the copyright holder .  In such
circumstances, a proclaimed ignorance of the law should not
allow the infringer to escape conviction.  Willfulness is often
established by circumstantial evidence, and may be inferred
from the facts and circumstances of each case.296
The willfulness definition has not gotten any clearer since the
Act’s passage.  The academic commentary remains confused
about the implications of the willfulness standard,297 and while
Second and Ninth Circuits which facilitated criminal prosecution of infringement in
the absence of some evidence of  deliberate intent cannot be invoked by authorities”
prosecuting NET Act cases.  Coble, supra  note 37, at 302.
293 See  Susan W. Brenner, Defining Cybercrime:  A Review of State and Federal
Law , in  CyberCrime:  The Investigation, Prosecution and Defense of a Computer-
Related Crime 11, 23-24 (Ralph D. Clifford ed., 2001); infra  notes 300-01 and ac-
companying text.
294 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, at § III(B)(3) (discussing the dif-
fering perspectives on willfulness from the legislators).
295 143 Cong. Rec. S12,689, S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).  Senator Hatch con-
tinues: “As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, that is the interpretation that I
give to this term.  Otherwise, I would have objected and not allowed this bill to pass
by unanimous consent.” Id.  This standard was also supported by the Business
Software Association, Hearings , supra  note 9, at 85 (statement of Brad Smith, Asso-
ciate General Counsel, Microsoft) (stating that “under criminal law a willful act re-
quires that it be intentionally done with knowledge that it was prohibited by law.”),
and the Register of Copyrights, id . at 31 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
296 143 Cong. Rec. H9883, H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (emphasis added); ac-
cord  143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte); 143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9886 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Frank) (approving Rep. Goodlatte’s statement).
297 Compare  Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital
Era , 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1716 (1999) (arguing that the NET Act codified the
“intent to infringe” definition) [hereinafter Harvard Note] with  Bailey, supra  note
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many cases have interpreted the term willfulness in a civil in-
fringement context, relatively few cases have done so in criminal
copyright cases.298  As a consequence, the case law continues to
create “uncertainty in an area already filled with vagueness, gray
areas, and doctrines with no bright line rules.”299
Almost everyone agrees that there is a majority and minority
view with respect to willfulness in the criminal copyright infringe-
ment context.  The majority view is that willfulness requires the
government to prove that the defendant specifically intended to
infringe such that the infringement was a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty.300  The minority view is that will-
fulness requires the government to prove only that the defendant
had the intent to copy.301
For purposes of understanding how the Act impacts our every-
day activities, the difference between the views is critical.  Under
the majority view, defenses to willfulness include the infringer’s
ignorance of the law,302 an infringer’s subjective good-faith belief
277, at 493 n.129 (“The legislative history of the NET Act appears to indicate that
criminal infringement is meant to be a strict liability crime.”).  Both extreme posi-
tions are questionable; but Bailey’s position is more so. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-339,
at 10 (1997) (citing with approval the DOJ’s distinction between criminal copyright
infringement and civil copyright infringement because the latter is a strict liability
tort—meaning, by implication, that criminal copyright infringement is not).
298 Loren, supra  note 22, at 876.
299 Id.  at 879.
300 SCOTT, supra  note 170, at 277 (citing United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp.
1046 (D. Neb. 1991)); accord  Randy Gidseg et al., Intellectual Property Crimes , 36
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835, 854 (1999); Heneghan, supra  note 44, at 34; Megan K.
Maher & Jon Michael Thompson, Intellectual Property Crimes , 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 763, 788 (2002); Wu, supra  note 291, at 547-48.  Nimmer characterizes this as
the “better” view. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2].
301 SCOTT, supra  note 170, at 277; accord  Gidseg et al., supra  note 300, at 854
(characterizing this doctrine as applicable only in the Second and Ninth Circuits);
Loren, supra  note 22, at 877.  Scott characterizes the minority view as “doubtful”
and says the language added by the Act to 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (“evidence of re-
production or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement”) further casts doubts on this view’s viability. SCOTT,
supra  note 170, at 277.  Nimmer says that this added language precludes any prose-
cutions based on simple proof of conduct violating the Copyright Act. NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, § 15.01[B][2].  Loren says the minority cases “are not
nearly as definite as commentators have made them out to be” and suggests that, in
even those cases, prosecutors need to show that the defendants knew that the law
prohibited their copying.  Loren, supra  note 22, at 877.
302 SCOTT, supra  note 170, at 278; Loren, supra  note 22, at 869; Wu, supra  note
291, at 549-51.
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that the use was fair,303 and the infringer’s subjective good-faith
belief that the infringing work was not actually infringing, be-
cause the new work was not substantially similar to the preexist-
ing work or a defense such as the First Sale doctrine applied.304
If ignorance of the law is a defense, then many otherwise in-
fringing activities would escape punishment.  Only in rare cases
can prosecutors overcome that defense.305  Similarly, a defense
that the infringer had a good faith belief that the use was fair
would significantly narrow the Act’s scope.  With the fair use de-
fense’s inherent unpredictability and inconsistency, defendants
can legitimately believe that most de minimis infringements com-
mitted during everyday activity constitute fair use.  However,
case law has already said that P2P file-sharing306 and warez trad-
ing307 are not fair use, so defendants may lack a good faith belief
in those situations.
Thus, under the majority view, the Act only criminalizes com-
mercial-scale infringers who have no hope of claiming ignorance
of the law or fair use.  Indeed, some commentators criticize the
majority view for this very reason.308  However, whether one
agrees or disagrees with the policy implications of the majority
view, there is some chance that the majority view will not apply
in a particular case.  In those cases, the minority view should ap-
ply, and defenses like ignorance of the law and a good faith but
erroneous belief in fair use may not be available.
This ambiguity forces rational, informed actors to stay clearly
303 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2]; Loren, supra  note 22, at
869, 887; Wu, supra  note 291, at 549-51.
304 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra  note 7, § 15.01[A][2]; Loren, supra  note 22, at
869; Wu, supra  note 291, at 548-49.  The First Sale doctrine permits a person possess-
ing an authorized copy of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of that copy without
violating the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute. See  17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(2000).
305 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(B)(3) (discussing ways to
overcome a defense of ignorance of the law).
306 See  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001),
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/239_F3d_1004.htm.
307 United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003).
308 See  Wu, supra  note 291, at 538; see also  Heneghan, supra  note 44, at 36 (“If a
person can claim ‘fair use’ and escape criminal penalties, then the law has no teeth
since alleged infringers will invariably assert this defense.”); Lauren Yamamoto,
Note, Copyright Protection and Internet Fan Sites:  Entertainment Industry Finds Sol-
ace in Traditional Copyright Law , 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 95, 118 (2000) (stating that
the willfulness standard “emasculates” the Act), available at  http://elr.lls.edu/ issues/
v20-issue1/yamamoto.pdf.
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away from criminal behavior,309 necessarily curtailing some legal
and socially desirable activity.310  Nimmer provides a good exam-
ple of such consequences.311  Dennis Erlich, a critic of the
Church of Scientology, electronically disseminated copyrighted
works owned by the Church as part of ridiculing those works.
While some cases treat such infringing ridicule as fair use,312 Er-
lich lost his case.313  Under the minority view, the Act could
make Erlich criminally liable for his infringement.314  With crimi-
nal exposure for infringing ridicule, this type of social commen-
tary will necessarily be chilled.  By potentially creating strict
limits on what forms of ridicule are permissible, the Act has a
significant social cost.
At minimum, a clear willfulness definition would expedite de-
cision-making.  While Congress failed to provide that, the Act
did say that “evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copy-
righted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful
infringement.”315  Unfortunately, this language does not help
courts select between the majority and minority definitions, for
the same reasons that the House Report’s statement “willfulness
requires intent” says nothing.  For now, we can only hope that
prosecutors continue to select cases with the majority view in
mind and that enough people remain uninformed about the law
so that they do not actually curtail beneficial activities.  Ulti-
mately, the courts may need to do what Congress failed to do
and clearly define willfulness in the criminal copyright infringe-
309 See  Loren, supra  note 22, at 894 (“An interpretation of the willfulness require-
ment of criminal infringement that does not require proof of knowledge of the legal
duties in the Copyright Act will thwart the underlying, constitutionally mandated
goal of copyright law by making individuals more reluctant to engage in activities
that may, in fact, be permitted by the [Copyright Act].”).
310 See  Moohr, supra  note 259, at 760-61; Harvard Note, supra  note 297, at 1706
(“By overdeterring private users, increased criminal penalties for copyright infringe-
ment will inhibit the free flow of information and thus impose costs that outweigh
the benefits from discouraging piracy.”). See generally  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
872 (1997) (discussing the detrimental impact of criminal laws on socially beneficial
activity on the Internet), available at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/ supct/html/96-
511.ZS.html.
311 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 155-56 (statement of David Nimmer).
312 E.g. , Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1995).
313 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
314 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 156 (statement of David Nimmer).
315 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
17/506.html.
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ment context.316
B. Criminalization of Facilitators
The Act’s coverage also leaves open the degree to which “facil-
itation” is criminalized.  This ambiguity can be traced to the Act’s
inception, because arguably LaMacchia did not commit copyright
infringement at all.  While LaMacchia created and maintained
Cynosure, which others used to commit copyright infringement,
the government did not allege that LaMacchia uploaded or
downloaded any copyrighted material himself.317  While the Act
should apply easily to Cynosure users for the files those users
personally uploaded and downloaded, it is less clear why
LaMacchia’s facilitation role should be criminalized.
Unfortunately, Congress did not specifically address why
LaMacchia’s actions were criminal or how the statute distin-
guishes between infringers and facilitators.  As with the willful-
ness definition, when this issue was raised to Congress,318 a
number of legislators made strong remarks that they did not
want the Act to cover Internet access providers,319 and Nimmer
even proposed language to correct this deficiency.320
However, Congress ultimately acknowledged this issue only
316 Cf.  Loren, supra  note 22, at 885 (“The importance of a clear understanding of
the contours of the willfulness standard for determining whether the government has
carried its burden of showing that the infringing conduct was criminal cannot be
overstated.”).
317 See supra  note 15 and accompanying text.
318 See , e.g. , Hearings , supra  note 9, at 148-56 (statement of David Nimmer).
319 See , e.g ., 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12690 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (stating that libraries and other Internet access providers were not
covered by the Act because they lack willfulness); Hearings , supra  note 9, at 7, 50,
163 (statement of Rep. Frank).
320 At the Subcommittee Hearings, Nimmer proposed an alternative standard for
criminal infringement: “Whoever places copyrighted, commercially-marketed mate-
rial on a computer system with the intent that it be accessible by the public without
the consent of the owner of the copyright shall be punished as provided [by law.]”
Hearings , supra  note 9, at 150 (statement of David Nimmer).  This standard would
have provided much-needed clarity on both the facilitator/infringer distinction and
willfulness issues.  Nimmer argued that this language would still have criminalized
LaMacchia’s behavior, id. , although if LaMacchia did not actually place any items
on Cynosure, he could be punished under Nimmer’s proposed language only under
an accomplice or conspiracy theory based on his encouragement and integral partici-
pation in the warez operation.  Because he felt Nimmer’s proposal overly immu-
nized service providers, Rep. Frank emphatically rejected it, characterizing it as “a
very grudging fix” with “huge loopholes” and “an opening negotiating position” that
was “not a good use of everybody’s time.” Hearings , supra  note 9, at 161 (statement
of Rep. Frank).
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through the weak clarifying language regarding willfulness dis-
cussed above.321  How does this language distinguish Internet ac-
cess providers from LaMacchia?  In other words, exactly what
did LaMacchia do beyond operating a website that reproduced
and distributed copyrighted works?
Two facts might distinguish LaMacchia from Internet access
providers.  First, LaMacchia encouraged infringement because he
allegedly requested his users to upload specific software to Cyno-
sure, and second, he knew Cynosure users would exchange pi-
rated software and wanted them to do so.322  While superficially
these differences may distinguish LaMacchia from an Internet
access provider who passively transmits packets across its net-
work, these factors do little to distinguish other types of online
service providers like web hosts that host infringing content or
directories or search engines that link to infringing content.323
Indeed, any individual or entity who commits contributory
civil infringement probably has criminal willfulness under either
the majority or minority view.324  Contributory civil copyright in-
fringement occurs when an individual with “knowledge of the in-
fringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.”325  Certainly anyone who meets
321 See  143 CONG. REC. H9883, H9884 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble) (saying the language means that the Act excludes third parties who electroni-
cally reproduce or distribute works on behalf of a third party); 143 CONG. REC.
H9883, H9885-86 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (believing
that this language removed Internet access providers from the Act); see also
Courtney Macavinta, Congress Approves Copyright Bill , CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 18,
1997, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-205520.html (“[T]he language of the final
bill makes it clear that ISPs and online services will not be held as ‘willfully infring-
ing’ just by doing their job, which is routing data across their servers.”) (quoting
David McClure, Executive Director, Association of Online Professionals).
322 See  Indictment, United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994)
(No. 9410092-RGS), available at  http://www-tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/LaMacchia/in-
dictment.html.  For example, LaMacchia posted the following text on Cynosure: “If
anyone has this stuff, I’d appreciate it.  Sim City 2000, Excel 5.0 (Windoze),
WordPerfect 6.0 (Windoze).” Id.  He also provided instructions about how to
upload files and encouraged uploading. Id.
323 At the 1997 Subcommittee Hearing, most of this discussion regarding
facilitator liability focused on “passive carriers” like Internet access providers and
did not explore other forms of facilitation. Hearings , supra  note 9, at 50-54, 64-65.
324 See  DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56 § III(E)(2) (in the case of Internet
infringement, the prosecutor has to prove that the defendant “maintained some
form of knowing control over the content and maintenance of the subject Web
site”—in other words, contributorily infringed).
325 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971).
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this standard will satisfy the minority view, but the combination
of scienter and involvement should satisfy the majority view as
well.  In the DMCA, Congress putatively provided some
facilitators a safe harbor from civil liability for user-caused in-
fringement,326 but this safe harbor has proved largely illusory be-
cause it does not appear to apply when an online service provider
meets the standard for contributory copyright liability.327  So, an-
yone who contributes to civil copyright infringement may also be
a criminal infringer (assuming, if applicable, the financial thresh-
olds are met).
Specifically, to the extent the provider otherwise meets the
definition of contributory infringement, any of the following ac-
tivities could lead to criminal prosecution:  allowing artists to
upload MP3 files for others to enjoy,328 providing access to
USENET newsgroups where some postings contain infringing
content,329 establishing web links to infringing content (either di-
rectly or by allowing a user to do so),330 operating P2P file-shar-
ing services,331 allowing users to conduct auctions of infringing
326 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c), (d) and (e) (2000), available at http://
www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/512.html.
327 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A); 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1), available at  http://www4.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/17/512.html; see  Jennifer Bretan, Harboring Doubts About the
Efficacy of § 512 Immunity Under the DMCA , 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 43 (2003).
328 See  Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 2d 503 (N.D.
Ohio 1997); Cf . Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (denying a fair use defense on the part of a website that allowed
users to post news stories for comment and criticism), available at http://www.law.
uh.edu/faculty/cjoyce/copyright/release10/LosAngT.html.
329 See  ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmties., Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding contributory liability in this context), available at  http://www.lclark.edu/
~loren/cyberlaw01/alscan.pdf.
330 See Hearings , supra  note 9, at 65 (statement of Marybeth Peters) (“Clearly
you would aid and abet if you had a site that said ‘Top ten pirated sites’ and led
everybody to them.”); DOJ IP Crimes Manual, supra  note 56, § III(E)(5) (discuss-
ing theories of how to prosecute for linking to infringing content); Goldstone &
O’Leary, supra  note 205, at 38-39 (discussing how criminal liability for facilitation
might attach on an aiding-and-abetting theory to individuals who link to infringing
content if the individual encourages infringement, evidences intent to infringe or has
an illicit relationship with the linked-to site); Shayesteh, supra  note 205, at 214 (ar-
guing that linking to warez should create contributory liability).
331 See  Bailey, supra  note 277, at 496-97 and 511 (arguing that P2P file-sharing
service Napster could be liable for conspiracy or aiding and abetting).  Cases holding
P2P file-sharing services contributorily liable include A & M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), available at  http://www.law.cornell. edu/
copyright/cases/239_F3d_1004.htm and In re  Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op3.fwx?submit1=showop&
caseno=02-4125.PDF. See supra  notes 278-83 and accompanying text (discussing
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items,332 operating swap meets,333 and operating a marketing net-
work for web sites that host infringing content.334
Obviously, many of these activities are primarily undertaken
commercially, so the risk of criminal liability in those cases did
not change due to the Act.  But should anyone want to under-
take these activities non-commercially, especially to promote so-
cial causes that cannot support a commercial endeavor or are not
permitted by commercial operations, the risks of criminal in-
fringement could overwhelm the desire to do so.  In this respect,
the failure to more clearly delineate between infringers and
facilitators once again can curtail socially beneficial activities.
V
DEFINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF CRIMINAL
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The previous Section discussed some practical harms created
by poor statute drafting.  More conceptually, the shoplifting anal-
ogy underlying the Act creates a scope problem.335  This analogy
treats every infringing copy as creating a criminally cognizable
loss336 even though such treatment overstates copyright owners’
lost revenues and copyright owners’ expenses not actually real-
ized.337 In turn, by overstating copyright owners’ harms, the
boundaries of criminal copyright law are extended too far.
The analogy overstates copyright owners’ lost revenues be-
Congress’ demands to prosecute these infringers). But see  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (re-
jecting contributory liability on the part of a P2P file-sharing software vendor), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/030425_order_on_motions.pdf.
332 See  Bob Liu, ‘Safe Harbor’ Case Mired in Confusion , INTERNETNEWS.COM,
May 15, 2003, at http://boston.internet.com/news/print.php/2206911 (discussing a
case holding Amazon.com liable for contributory infringement for an infringing
DVD made available for sale through its auction tools). But see  Hendricks v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc., No. CV 02-08443 TJH (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2003).
333 See  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996), availa-
ble at  http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/76_F3d_259.htm.
334 See  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
335 See Moohr, supra  note 259, at 756-57.
336 ARIEL KATZ, A NETWORK EFFECTS PERSPECTIVE ON SOFTWARE PIRACY 44
(University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-
01, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID386141_
code030310570.pdf?abstractid=386141 (“[T]he governing paradigm of copyright
law . . . assumes that every unauthorized copy of a protected work harms the copy-
right holder . . . .”).
337 Team Report, supra  note 60, at 15-16.
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cause more copies are treated as a criminal loss than are actually
lost.  This overcounting occurs because individuals have hetero-
geneous reservation prices for copyrighted works, so some indi-
viduals may procure a cheap infringing copy (where the cost is
below their reservation price) but would not have procured a
more expensive copy (where the cost exceeds their reservation
price).338  In those cases, not every copy substitutes for the origi-
nal; some may be evaluation copies, trophies, or never used at
all.
This phenomenon is most obvious in cases where infringing
copies can be procured for free.  In those cases, the infringing
work’s “cost” (zero) is below everyone’s reservation price, and
thus more copies are made than would have occurred at a higher
price.339  Theoretically, a copyright owner’s actual loss could be
accurately calculated by recreating a demand curve and exclud-
ing all copies procured by infringers whose reservation price was
below the retail value.  Without such calculations, treating each
copy as a loss to copyright owners overstates the true demand for
the work.
The analogy also overstates lost revenues because some copy-
right owners may implicitly want infringement to occur.  Specifi-
cally, software vendors may tolerate piracy either as a way to
price discriminate against individuals with heterogeneous reser-
vation prices or to create barriers to entry by locking in users
(network effects).340  If so, the Act may counterproductively
criminalize behavior that software vendors desire and encourage.
The shoplifting analogy also ignores expenses a copyright
owner did not incur.  Shoplifting protects retailers from the ex-
propriation of rivalrous goods, where a retailer is deprived of the
good and the money spent to procure it.  In contrast, copyrighted
works are non-rivalrous, so infringement by copying does not de-
338 See generally  Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law:
Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights , 54 HASTINGS L. J. 167 (2002) (discussing the problems of criminalizing
the theft of intangibles).
339 Certainly in the case of warez traders, the reservation price of most of the
items they download or collect is zero. See  Tetzlaff, supra  note 10, at 109 (“With the
exception of a few games, there is probably nothing in [a warez trader’s] collection
that he would buy if he couldn’t obtain it for free.”).
340 See , e.g. , Katz, supra  note 336; Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the
Networked Age , POLICY ANALYSIS, May 15, 2002, at 4 (discussing theories), availa-
ble at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa438.pdf.
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prive a retailer (or anyone else) any direct out-of-pocket costs.341
By overstating the harm suffered by the copyright owner, the
Act extends the criminal borders to situations where the law
treats the infringement as causing criminal harm, even though no
actual harm has occurred to the copyright owner.  As we saw
with the consequences of an imprecise definition of willfulness,
this focus on technical, not substantive, harm puts otherwise so-
cially-permissible activities in jeopardy.
The broad definition of “loss” prompts a more fundamental
inquiry.  Because we cannot determine with precision when real
loss occurs, at what point should loss suffered by a copyright
owner be recognized as criminal harm?
Specifically, once Congress internalized the shoplifting para-
digm, Congress had to decide how much “loss” warrants criminal
punishment.  The answer:  $1,000 of copyrighted works in a six-
month period.  There are no minimum number of infringing cop-
ies and no need to show connections between disparate acts of
infringement.342  Thus, the Act equally criminalizes individuals
who willfully infringe a single work worth more than $1 million
and individuals who, in aggregate, willfully infringe $5.56 per day
doing normal daily activities.
In today’s digital society, this financial threshold is uncomfort-
ably easy to reach.  Consider an individual who downloads a few
MP3 files every day using a P2P file-sharing software, softlifts a
couple of software programs for telecommuting purposes, and
forwards by email an article or two a day to friends.  Each indi-
vidual incident of infringement may be trivial, but in 180 days the
aggregate consequence of these activities could easily pass the
$1,000 threshold.343  If so, willfulness and prosecutorial discretion
are the only things that keep this individual out of jail—even if
341 Cf . Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984)
(rejecting an argument that copyright infringement can be analogized to the theft of
a physical item), available at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/sony_v_universal_deci-
sion.html.
342 See  H.R. Rep. 102-997, at 6 (1992) (discussing the desire to aggregate different
copyrighted works in the same prosecution).
343 Bailey illustrates how a P2P file-sharer using a high-speed connection could
reach the financial threshold after three hours of downloading. See  Bailey, supra
note 277, at 519-20.  Duncan Frissell illustrates how a P2P file-sharer could reach the
financial threshold by averaging nine music downloads per day.  Posting of Declan
McCullagh, declan@well.com, to politech@politechbot.com (July 25, 2001, 20:28:14),
at http://politechbot.com/p-02305.html.
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none of these activities cause the copyright owner any actual eco-
nomic loss.
So how did this threshold—$1,000 in 180 days—get set so low?
The DOJ expressed reservations about the broad sweep of a low
dollar threshold,344 as did the Register of Copyrights, who advo-
cated that criminal liability should require “substantial economic
harm.”345  Recall that LaMacchia had been accused of infringing
over $1 million  of software in a little over a month.346  If the goal
was to make sure prosecutors could bust LaMacchia, how did
Congress go from LaMacchia’s $1,000,000 in one month to the
Act’s $1,000 in 180 days?
As initially introduced in the House, the first draft of the Act
proposed a felony standard of $5,000 and a misdemeanor stan-
dard of $0 (that is, every willful infringement was a misde-
meanor).347  The House Report implies that, after the 1997
Subcommittee Hearing, a back-room deal was struck to address
concerns that the proposed misdemeanor standard overly
criminalized de minimis activities.348  To avoid that, the misde-
meanor standard rose to $1,000 and the felony standard re-
mained at $2,500 (the threshold prior to the Act) instead of the
proposed $5,000.349
It might seem odd that the Act initially proposed an initial fi-
nancial threshold of $0 for misdemeanors, but it should not.  Be-
cause the shoplifting analogy treats every copy as criminally-
cognizable harm, why should copyright owners lose a penny?
The $0 proposed threshold was the inevitable implication of the
shoplifting analogy.
However, the $1,000 “compromise” appears to be wholly arbi-
trary and not particularly effective.  Congress did not cite any
supporting evidence to show how the financial threshold pro-
vides any meaningful safe harbor for de minimis infringement.
From the prosecutor’s perspective, proving $1,000 of infringe-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt may create significant eviden-
344 Hearings , supra  note 9, at 45 (statement of Kevin DiGregory).
345 Id.  at 30 (statement of Marybeth Peters).  Peters proposed a financial thresh-
old of $5,000 in 180 days. Id.
346 See  Indictment, United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994)
(No. 9410092-RGS), available at  http://www.tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/LaMacchia/
indictment.html.
347 H.R. 2265, 105th Cong. (1997).
348 H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 8 (1997).
349 Id.
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tiary and proof problems that, in practice, limit the defendants
who can realistically be pursued.  But from a defendant’s per-
spective who wants to avoid any risk of criminal infringement
and who has full information about all of the infringements he or
she has committed, the standard of $5.56 of infringement per day
has the practical consequence of criminalizing aggregated de
minimis infringements.
To solve this problem, the financial threshold could be
raised,350 or the financial threshold could be met only through a
single coordinated set of activities (such as all downloads made
from a warez site operated by the defendant) instead of disparate
unrelated activities.  Alternatively, the time horizon for aggregat-
ing infringements could be reduced, say to one week instead of
six months, increasing the minimum daily infringement to $142.
One other simple solution should be considered:  eliminating
17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) entirely.  If Congress wants to criminalize
systematic warez trading, it has already successfully done so by
redefining “financial gain” to include bartering.351  This defini-
tion has already successfully contributed to some warez trader
convictions352 and should successfully apply to most or all large-
scale warez trading cases.  Meanwhile, the financial gain defini-
tion, even as redefined, does not expose most daily activities to
infringement for daily activities, which rarely are done with any
expectations of value in return.  Thus, the simple deletion of 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)—effectively undoing the shoplifting anal-
ogy—still preserves Congress’s true objectives without unneces-
sarily broad criminal boundaries.
350 Heneghan proposes a financial threshold of at least $100,000.  Heneghan,
supra  note 44, at 34.
351 See  17 U.S.C. § 101 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003), available at  http://www4.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/17/101.html; Fois, supra note 35; 143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12690
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (expecting the revised definition
to cover bartering for or trading pirated software).  Sen. Hatch explained that “[t]he
intent of the change is to hold criminally liable those who do not receive or expect to
receive money but who receive tangible value,” but does not include “enhancement
of reputation” or tangential value (such as a job promotion).  143 CONG. REC.
S12689, S12690 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Interestingly, the DOJ has taken the position that, even prior to the Act, it could
prosecute warez traders based on a theory that bartering constituted financial gain.
United States Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions, United
States v. Rothberg, No. 00-CR-85, at 7 n.1 and 11 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
352 See , e.g. , United States v. Slater, 2003 WL 22519692 (7th Cir. 2003); Statement
of Facts, United States v. Tresco, No. 02-CR-132-A, at 8 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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CONCLUSION
It is tempting to dismiss the No Electronic Theft Act as one of
those laws in which the copyright owners got additional eco-
nomic protectionism353 but to little consequence.  With the small
number and relative appropriateness of prosecutions to date, one
might conclude that the Act is not a big deal.
Unfortunately, the Act’s procedural history provides little
comfort.354  Congress’s consideration of the Act does not evi-
dence any understanding about who the Act was trying to regu-
late, what motivated these individuals, how the Act would shape
those motivations, what mechanisms already tried to motivate
those individuals, and the efficacy of the alternative
mechanisms.355
Substantively, the Act fares little better.  The Act has not de-
monstrably reduced piracy, nor should it realistically be expected
to.  Congress does not really draft laws with an eye toward maxi-
mum efficacy356 and the Act sweeps in more than just reprehensi-
ble conduct, making it seem unjust and thus unsupportable.357
Meanwhile, the Act’s ambiguity and overinclusiveness curb legit-
imate copying, both copying necessary to handle our daily duties
and copying that is part of a vibrant social discourse.
While these detrimental impacts have been limited by broad
ignorance about the law’s scope, the law imposes a social cost to
those aware of it, and that cost escalates each time Congress
353 See  Katz, supra  note 336, at 45 (“[A]iding such copyright holders with addi-
tional funds spent on enforcement of copyright law by government agencies
(through criminal proceedings, for example) is merely an additional subsidy for cop-
yright holders with no positive influence on the general welfare . . . .”).
354 See  Tyler, supra  note 199, at 233 (“In the area of intellectual property . . .
people need to believe that the rules established serve reasonable social purposes
and are not simply efforts to create profits for special interest groups, such as large
corporations.”).
355 Cf.  Douglas N. Husak, Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of
Criminal Law , in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY:  DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 36
(Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) (suggesting that no criminal law should
be enacted unless the law is better than other alternatives).
356 See  Stuntz, supra  note 262, at 508 (suggesting that Congress does not care
about the normative implications of new criminal laws it passes); id.  at 549 (“Crime
definition usually carries low political returns; it is hardly a surprise that legislators
spend relatively little time on it.”).
357 See  I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringment , 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 305 (2002); Tyler, supra  note 199 (arguing that people comply with laws they
believe are moral and legitimate, and thus laws that are discordant with widespread
views of morality have little chance of success); accord  Husak, supra  note 355, at 43.
See generally  Moohr, supra  note 259, at 767-74.
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noisily demands the punishment of average Americans.  As just
one of many such exhortations, in March 2003, Rep. Carter said:
I think that it would be a good idea to go out and actually bust
a couple of these college kids.  And you know, if you want to
see college kids duck and run, you let them read in the paper
that somebody got about a 33 month sentence in the Federal
penitentiary for downloading copyrighted material . . . .358
These types of demands, a perverse desire in Congress to see av-
erage Americans suffer the consequences of an unprincipled
criminal law, make the Act a big deal.
Meanwhile, Congress is adrift in its efforts to develop a sensi-
ble policy about criminalizing copyright infringement.359  Recent
Congressional proposals to expand criminal copyright law and its
enforcement360 reflect a shotgun approach, a desperate attempt
to find some way to make Americans change their behavior.  But
ad hoc proposals to increasingly put average Americans under
tighter criminal controls are not the answer.  The answer is to
provide Americans with laws they can respect because they fairly
distinguish between true criminals and the average American.
And on that front, Congress has much more work to do.
358 Hearing , supra  note 280, at 104 (statement of Rep. John R. Carter). But cf.
143 CONG. REC. S12689, S12689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(saying that if overzealous prosecutors go after college pranksters, he hoped judges
would be lenient).
359 Lisa Friedman, Web Pirates Plunder On , DAILY NEWS OF L.A., June 23, 2003,
at N1. See generally  Stuntz, supra  note 262.
360 Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (pro-
posing stronger education and enforcement efforts of the law), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:h2517
ih.txt.pdf; Author, Consumer and Computer Owner Protection and Security (AC-
COPS) Act of 2003, H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (proposing, among other things, to
criminalize the willful uploading of a single infringing work), available at  http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:h2752
ih.txt.pdf; Artists’ Rights and Theft Protection Act of 2003, S.1932, 108th Cong. § 4
(among other provisions, proposing to make the placement of a single copy of a pre-
release copyrighted work (such as a pre-release version of a movie) in a P2P file-
sharing software’s share directory a felony).
